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INTRODUCTION
When and why should a “right to” include a “right not to”? If people have
a constitutional right to engage in an activity or to receive a procedural
protection, under what circumstances should they also have a right not to
engage in that activity or to refuse that process?
These questions demand more attention than they have received,1 because
the metes and bounds of constitutional freedom depend in large part on whether
people can decline to do or accept the activities and processes the Constitution
enumerates. The First Amendment’s “freedom of speech,” to take one

1. Many scholars have addressed the relationship between rights to and not to in specific
contexts, especially speech and association. See, e.g., HAIG BOSMAJIAN, THE FREEDOM NOT TO
SPEAK 195 (1999) (“My primary argument here is that just as the suppression of expression of belief is
‘an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man’s essential nature,’ so too is compelled political
and religious speech.”); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 30 (1970)
(“Forcing public expression of a belief is an affront to personal integrity.”); Larry Alexander,
Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 153–61 (2006) (considering “whether, apart from the
legitimacy of government’s purposes in coercing speech, there are harms to the coerced individual
from being forced to affirm a proposition he does not believe”); David B. Gaebler, First Amendment
Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995 (1982);
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Essay, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 839, 874 (2005) (“Compelled association . . . displays an objectionable indifference to the
autonomous thought processes manifested in voluntary social associations and their genesis, while yet
representing an effort to make use of the character virtues associated with the close connections that
are the product of voluntary association.”). But John Garvey seems to be the only legal scholar who
has given sustained attention to the relationship as a whole. See generally JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT
ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996) [hereinafter GARVEY, FREEDOMS] (arguing that freedoms are rights to
engage in good actions, and that rights to should only encompass rights not to if the latter also serve
the good).
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prominent example, has long been recognized as a keystone of American
constitutional law and democracy. But until West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette2 established a First Amendment right not to speak,
loyalty oaths and other forms of compelled speech were widespread.3 Similarly,
the Sixth Amendment’s right to “assistance of counsel” has been central to
constitutional criminal procedure ever since the Bill of Rights was ratified.4 But
until Faretta v. California5 announced a Sixth Amendment right of selfrepresentation, criminal defendants had no right to refuse counsel’s assistance.
Other examples are not hard to find. Indeed, many of the most contentious and
significant debates in American constitutional law can be understood as
arguments about whether particular “rights to” encompass “rights not to”:
whether the right “to bear or beget a child” implies a right not to,6 whether the
right to live includes a right to assisted suicide,7 and so on.
Constitutional law does not supply straightforward solutions to these
debates, nor can they be resolved through acontextual analytic reasoning.
Determining whether a particular “right to” should be accompanied by a “right
not to” is fundamentally an inquiry into the principles or values associated with
the right. It might appear, for example, that the right not to speak is a logically
necessary part of the “freedom of speech.”8 But the Supreme Court effectively
denied the existence of such a right as late as 1940,9 before endorsing it three
years later in Barnette.10 And of course many other constitutional “rights to”
still do not carry with them a “right not to.” For example, criminal defendants
can be compelled to accept procedural guarantees such as a speedy and public
trial11 or a jury of their peers.12 Thus the relationship between rights to and not
2. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
3. See generally BOSMAJIAN, supra note 1 (describing loyalty oaths and other incidents of
compelled speech in American history).
4. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (finding the right to be fundamental).
5. 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“Although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so many
words, the right to self-representation—to make one’s own defense personally—is thus necessarily
implied by the structure of the Amendment.”).
6. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (basing right to contraception in
notions of privacy and autonomy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(taking a similar approach to abortion).
7. See infra Part II.B.1.
8. The Justices themselves have sometimes suggested that the two concepts are inevitably
intertwined. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (“[T]he First
Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what
to say and what not to say.”) (emphasis added).
9. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding compulsory flag salute
and recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in public school).
10. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
11. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382 (1979) (“While the Sixth Amendment
guarantees to a defendant in a criminal case the right to a public trial, it does not guarantee the right to
compel a private trial.”); id. at 384 (“[A] defendant cannot convert his right to a speedy trial into a right
to compel an indefinite postponement . . . .”).
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to is itself a product and a part of value-laden debates about the purposes and
foundations of particular rights. Some rights encompass rights not to while
others do not, and separating the former from the latter demands more than the
application of formal logic.
The relationship between rights to and not to is therefore important
enough to demand analysis, and dynamic enough to respond to it. But thus far
the relationship has received only partial or indirect attention from judges and
scholars. Some argue that it is descriptively “axiomatic” (even if undesirable)
that a right to includes a right not to.13 But doctrine does not support this
axiom, and never has. Few criminal procedure rights permit their bearers to
insist on the inverse of their enumerated guarantees,14 and the Thirteenth
Amendment does not create a right to be a slave.15 Other scholars,
understanding that the symmetry axiom is not universally true, have focused on
particular rights to and not to, especially the right to speak or not16 and the right
to associate or not.17 These rights-specific inquiries are valuable on their own
terms, but do not offer much guidance as to how other rights can or should be
analyzed. Finally, many scholars have devoted sustained attention to the
important question of when constitutional rights are or should be waivable.18
But as the discussion below demonstrates, waiving a right to X and claiming a
right to not-X are significantly different.19
Drawing on these lines of scholarship and others, this Article attempts to
provide a novel and comprehensive account of the relationship between rights
to and not to in American constitutional law. The basic goals of the piece are to
show why that relationship is important, to explore how doctrine has implicitly
and sometimes awkwardly dealt with it, and to suggest modes of analysis with
which it can be explained and evaluated. In doing so, the Article argues that
what appear to be formal, logical symmetries between rights to and not to are in
fact the products of deeply normative decisions about the purposes and
functions of particular rights. To know whether a right to encompasses a right
not to, then, one must understand the values underlying the right. Part II first

12. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965) (“[T]here is no federally recognized right to
a criminal trial before a judge sitting alone . . . .”).
13. See GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 39 (“It is axiomatic in modern constitutional law
that freedoms are bilateral rights.”).
14. See infra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
15. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243–44 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 207, 217–18 (1905).
16. See, e.g., BOSMAJIAN, supra note 1, at 195; EMERSON, supra note 1, at 30; Alexander,
supra note 1, at 153–61; see also SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 1.
17. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 874; Gaebler, supra note 1.
18. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801 (2003); Edward L.
Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981); William J. Stuntz,
Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761 (1989).
19. See infra Part I.
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creates a taxonomy that describes the form and function of rights to and not to.
Part III then outlines normative frameworks that can help explain current
practice and enable prescriptive analysis.
Part I begins with the proposition that a right regarding X can be
understood in three main ways. A choice right is a right to both X and not-X,
where not-X means refusing to do or accept X. An option right is a right to X.
And a protection right is a right to not-X. These three frameworks are the basic
building blocks of the Article’s analysis. Because X can either be a
“substantive” guarantee of individual conduct such as the right to free speech,
or a “procedural”20 limitation on government conduct such as the right to a
speedy trial, this tripartite taxonomy captures a wide range of constitutional
rights. And like all rights, the three frameworks described here can be defined
not only by the actions they protect but also by the particular kinds of
government power they limit.21 A right to X—a right to engage in an activity or
receive a process, in other words—is a limitation on the government’s power to
restrain or deny X. A right to not-X, by contrast—a right not to engage in an
activity or to refuse a process—is a limitation on the government’s power to
coerce or enforce X. The three frameworks can therefore be understood as
prohibiting restraint of X, coercion of X, or both.
The differences between these three frameworks of rights—those
guaranteeing a choice, an option, or protection—are stark, and the question of
classification is therefore a crucial part of defining a right’s scope. Consider
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in which the Supreme Court held that the Boy
20. I employ these terms with some hesitation, knowing that the distinction between
substantive and procedural rights is blurry at best. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The
Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that rights
should be understood as limitations on government power to regulate conduct, not as “personal”
guarantees to engage in that conduct). Compare John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974) (“We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the
line between substance and procedure.”), with Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the SubstanceProcedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 (2011) (arguing that the line is identifiable and
desirable).
I use the terms to separate those rights regarding individual conduct—speech, religious practice,
arms bearing, and the like—from those regarding the mechanisms by which the government can
regulate it—speedy trials, procedural due process, and so on. I assume that the difference between
these categories of rights is more or less intuitive, but the dichotomy can safely be ignored if my
assumption is faulty.
The Article does not analyze structural guarantees: those establishing the functioning of, and
relationship between, the various institutions and branches of government. Such “rights”—
requirements of bicameralism and presentment, for example, or perhaps even of federalism itself—are
usually (though not always) unwaivable. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182
(1992) (“Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the
constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436, 447 (1883) (noting states’ ability to waive their sovereign immunity).
21. See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (describing rights in terms of the correlative duties they impose on
others).
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Scouts had a right, grounded in the freedom of association, to exclude a gay
scoutmaster.22 The reasoning and result of Dale would look different under
each of the three frameworks described here. If association is a choice right,
then the Scouts had rights both to associate and not to associate (i.e., X and notX)—a freedom from restraint and coercion with regard to association. Since
New Jersey’s antidiscrimination law arguably forced the Scouts to associate
with unwanted members by forbidding exclusion on the basis of sexuality, the
Scouts could therefore invoke their right not to associate. On this account,
which happens to reflect current doctrine,23 Dale was rightly decided, or at least
was properly characterized as a freedom of association case.24
But it is possible to imagine a world in which the “right to associate” is
exactly that and nothing more. Associating and not-associating, after all, may
serve the same values, but they are not the same thing. One action can logically
exist without the other. If association is an option right, then the Scouts had
only a right to associate—a freedom from government restraint. Such a right
would not limit the government’s power to coerce the Scouts into associating
with unwanted members. On this account, the Scouts could not challenge the
antidiscrimination law on associational grounds, and Dale was wrongly
decided. Finally, if association is a protection right, then the Scouts had a right
not to associate, but no affirmative right to do so. They would therefore be free
from coercion, but not from restraint. The government could not force the
Scouts to associate with homosexuals, but could forbid them to associate at all.
On this reading, Dale was rightly decided on associational grounds.
As Part III demonstrates, choosing between these approaches—
determining whether a particular guarantee is a choice, option, or protection
right—is fundamentally a normative inquiry into the substantive purposes of
the right, not solely a matter of finding symmetries or applying formal logic. It
might seem obviously correct, for example, that the First Amendment is a
choice right while the Eighth Amendment is a protection right. But this is only
obvious in light of the purposes those Amendments are meant to serve, not the

22. 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Freedom of
association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”).
24. This Article is concerned with scope of coverage rather than strength of protection, and so
does not ask to what degree rights to X or not-X can be regulated. Frederick Schauer, Categories and
the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 275–76 (1981) (describing
difference between coverage and protection).
By bracketing that question, however, I do not mean to downplay its significance. The fact that all
rights are regulable suggests that rights to and not to are more similar than they may seem, because
neither is absolute. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Article, which attempts a broad overview of
many different constitutional rights, it would be impossible to discuss with requisite precision the
myriad tests and standards that apply to the regulation of various rights. Elsewhere, I explore in more
depth the regulation of one specific right to and not to. See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or
Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2012).
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conduct or processes they enumerate. That is, one cannot deduce whether a
right to X includes a right to not-X based on acontextual analytic reasoning.
Instead, the classification of a right within the taxonomy depends on the values
or purposes associated with the right.
Precisely which values or purposes lead to the creation of choice rights is
difficult to say in the abstract; the answer varies as much as the rights
themselves. Nevertheless, two broad normative frameworks seem to have
emerged. First, as Part III.B.1 explains, rights may be classified as guaranteeing
a choice, an option, or protection based on whether they exist to further the
interests of the individual rightsholder or a broader social interest. To the
degree that a right has a “public” component, it is usually treated as an option
or protection right.25 To the degree that a right is purely “personal,” however, it
will usually be treated as a choice right, at least if the purpose of the right is to
protect the autonomy of the individual rightsholders (as potentially opposed to,
for example, their dignity). This characteristic manifests itself prominently in
the constitutional concept of “privacy,” which has been closely associated with
autonomy26 and, in turn, what this Article calls choice rights. For example,
many judges and scholars have identified privacy and autonomy as the
constitutional values behind the rights to choose whether to speak,27 whether to
associate,28 “whether to bear or beget a child,”29 and whether to accept
counsel.30

25. A similar inquiry is often employed to determine whether a right should be waivable. See,
e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945) (concluding that private rights with
public implications should not be waivable, since waiver “would thwart the legislative policy which it
was designed to effectuate”); Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of
Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1999) (arguing that interests of third parties and the
general public may justify restrictions on waiver).
26. See infra Part III.B.1; Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410,
1425 (1974) (“Primarily and principally the new Right of Privacy is a zone of prima facie autonomy,
of presumptive immunity from regulation, in addition to that established by the first amendment.”); see
also Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9
(1971) (“Justice Douglas called the amendments and their penumbras ‘zones of privacy,’ though of
course they are not that at all. They protect both private and public behavior and so would more
properly be labeled ‘zones of freedom.’”).
27. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) (concluding that compelled speech “violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message”); C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 1000 (1978)
[hereinafter Baker, Scope of the First Amendment] (“[R]espect for the integrity and autonomy of the
individual usually requires giving each person at least veto power over the use of her own body and,
similarly, over her own speech.”); Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the
Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1333–34 (1998) (“Coerced
expression . . . does violence to the autonomy and dignity of the self. Thus the right to self-expression
includes the capacity to determine whether, how, and to whom one wishes to express oneself.”).
28. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18 (describing privacy as protecting certain intimate
associations from incursion by the state).

01-Blocher (Do Not Delete)

768

7/29/2012 12:13:27 AM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:761

And yet even rights with instrumental purposes—those that exist to
protect more than autonomy—sometimes can be classified as choice rights.31
As Part III.B.2 explains, this can happen in at least three scenarios. First, it can
occur where X and not-X depend on one another to further a particular
constitutional value. This helps explain the choice right of expressive
association, because it would arguably be difficult or impossible for groups to
express themselves if they could not exclude those who would interfere with
their messages.32 Second, an instrumental right can be a choice right where X
and not-X are independent, but nonetheless further the same constitutional
value. This might be the case with the Second Amendment. In District of
Columbia v. Heller33 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,34 the Supreme Court
found that the “central component” and “core lawful purpose” protected by the
Second Amendment is self-defense,35 particularly in the home.36 Inasmuch as
the decision not to keep or bear arms in one’s home is a safety decision akin to
self-defense, it should arguably be protected by the Amendment for the simple
reason that it furthers the same constitutional value.37 The third scenario is
where X and not-X further different values, both of which are constitutionally
salient. This might explain the right of adults to or (presumably) not to engage
in sexual intercourse. The former component is protected—to some degree,
29. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (basing right to contraception in
notions of privacy and autonomy); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (quoting Eisenstadt).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[The right to
self-representation] is designed to safeguard the dignity and autonomy of those whose circumstances
or activities have thrust them involuntarily into the criminal process.”); Erica J. Hashimoto,
Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147,
1149 (2010) (defending Faretta on the basis that “the Framers intended to protect the autonomy of
criminal defendants when they drafted the Bill of Rights”).
31. Cf. GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 18 (“[F]reedoms are not necessarily bilateral.
Whether they are or are not depends on the principles they revolve around.”).
32. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“Forcing a group to accept certain
members may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it
intends to express.”); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (“There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into
the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the original members to
express only those views that brought them together.”).
33. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
34. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
35. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599; id. at 630; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (“Self-defense is a basic
right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present day, and in Heller, we held
that individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second Amendment right.”) (internal
citation omitted).
36. Heller noted that “the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute” in one’s
home, and emphasized “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home.” 554 U.S. at 628, 635; see also Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the HomeBound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1321–36 (2009).
37. See generally Blocher, supra note 24 (advocating, with qualifications, the recognition of
such a right).

01-Blocher (Do Not Delete)

2012]

7/29/2012 12:13:27 AM

RIGHTS TO AND NOT TO

769

anyway—by privacy interests deriving from the Due Process Clause.38 The
latter, which is reassuringly untested in American constitutional law,39 would
seem to be supported by not only privacy interests, but also by those deriving
from bodily integrity and perhaps even the Thirteenth Amendment.
Establishing this taxonomy and excavating its normative foundations can
clarify rights discourse, and may help resolve rights debates. Some courts and
legal commentators have seen the connections between rights to and rights not
to, but their discussions are often clouded by imprecision and inaccuracy, such
as the erroneous but common statement that a right to X must necessarily
include a right to not-X.40 Moreover, some of the most important scholarly and
public debates in constitutional law feature people talking past each other
because they disagree about how to characterize X or its proper role. This
Article will not resolve these debates, but its taxonomy may at the very least
provide a common vocabulary. And its exploration of the taxonomy’s
inescapable normativity may help move those debates away from unexamined
assumptions and towards clear discussions of differing conceptions of rights.41
This is an Article about American rights discourse, not a philosophical
evaluation of rights in the abstract. That framing is both a limitation and a
strength. As to the former, the taxonomy laid out in Part II does not address all
imaginable forms of rights, and the normative frameworks described in Part III

38. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
39. Cf. Glanville Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1129, 1130
(1956) (“Most legal liberties are not to be found stated in law books, because there is generally no
point in making these negative statements.”).
40. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 797 (1988); see, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court’s Law of
Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 581, 596 n.57 (1995)
(“[F]reedom of speech necessarily entails the right not to speak.”); John O. McGinnis, Reviving
Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
485, 528 (2002) (“The power to define who may deliver messages logically includes the power to
exclude those parties whose identity is incompatible with the message.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1922 (2001) (noting freedom of expressive
association “logically entails a freedom of autonomous message formation and delivery by the group,
including the right of the group to define itself . . . and, finally, to exclude competing messages from
being intermingled with the group’s chosen expression”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public
Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243, 248
(1996) (“The right to speak entails the right not to speak.”); Hillary A. Webber, Equal Justice Under
the Law: Why IOLTA Programs Do Not Violate the First Amendment, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 506
(2003) (referring to the right not to speak and the right not to associate as “corollary rights” of the right
to speak and the right to associate); Lloyd L. Weinreb, A Secular Theory of Natural Law, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2295 (2004) (“A right to do something is also, necessarily, a right not to do
it; for if one did not have a right not to do it, there would be no point in saying that one has a right to do
it.”).
41. As noted in the Conclusion, the most prominent example of this is the ongoing debate over
the relevance of “action” and “inaction” in the context of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010, the constitutionality of which will likely be resolved by the Supreme Court by the time
this Article is in print. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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do not even begin to reflect the richness of the literature on rights’ functions
and purposes. But sufficient unto the Article are the problems thereof. By
focusing specifically on existing rights doctrine and discourse, this Article aims
to unearth and explore the importance of, relationship between, and rationales
behind rights to and not to in the American constitutional tradition.
I.
CHOICE RIGHTS, OPTION RIGHTS, AND PROTECTION RIGHTS
Understanding the relationship between rights to and not to requires
knowing what it means to say that a person “has a right to X.” That is a more
complex proposition than it may seem. The scope of a rightsholder’s freedom
with regard to X varies depending on whether she can do or demand X, refuse
to do or accept X, or choose between those possibilities. In other words, she can
have a right to, a right not to, or a right to and not to. These three frameworks
are importantly distinct, and they are designed to limit different kinds of
government interference: restraint, coercion, or both. If a right to X is a sword
that enables its bearer to cut through government restraint, a right to not-X is a
shield that protects its bearer from government coercion. The three frameworks
are the three possible combinations of sword and shield.42
This Article calls these three frameworks choice rights, option rights, and
protection rights, and as the following discussion demonstrates, they can be
used to describe and analyze much of American constitutional law. Choice
rights protect both X and not-X—the ability to choose whether to X—and
therefore limit the government’s power to restrain or compel X. As noted
above, the freedom of speech is a choice right, which means that it includes a
right to speak and a concomitant right not to,43 and thus that the government
can neither restrain nor coerce speech. Most substantive rights are choice
rights, including the First Amendment freedoms of speech,44 religious
practice,45 and association.46 By contrast, few procedural rights are choice
rights. Although many can be waived, hardly any constitutional procedures can

42. The fourth possible combination—neither sword nor shield—is equivalent to the absence
of a right. As discussed in Part II.D, option and protection rights are so similar that they sometimes
appear interchangeable, and yet they remain importantly distinct from choice rights.
43. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 797; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
559–60 (1985) (concluding that the First Amendment freedom of expression “includes both the right
to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all”) (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 714 (1977)).
44. Riley, 487 U.S. at 797.
45. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause
protects the right to engage in religious activity and also prohibits the government from “compel[ling]
affirmation of religious belief[s]”).
46. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (“Freedom of association . . . plainly
presupposes a freedom not to associate.”).
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be refused. The right to counsel is the only notable example of a procedural
choice right.47
Option rights protect only X, and therefore prohibit government restraint
but not government coercion. An option right is something of a constitutional
Hobson’s Choice48—a take-it-or-leave-it freedom that can be invoked in only
one direction. The holder of an option right is free to do or demand X, but is not
free to refuse it. Although most substantive rights are choice rights, some of the
fiercest battles in constitutional law can be understood as arguments about
whether some of them should be treated as option rights. Many people have
argued, for example, that the right to live should not include the right to die,49
or that the right to bear a child should not include the right to terminate a
pregnancy.50 In both cases, there is general agreement about one “side” of the
right—to live, or to bear children—and wide disagreement about whether it has
a reflection. By contrast, most procedural guarantees are option rights. A
criminal defendant can demand a speedy trial, for example, but cannot insist on
a slow one. The government can therefore give a speedy trial whether the
defendant wants it or not.51 Waiver, in other words, relieves the government of
a duty with regard to X rather than creating a duty with regard to not-X.52
47.
48.

See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
The phrase refers to an offer in which only one option is given. See Hobson’s Choice,
PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/hobsons-choice.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2012) (“Hobson rented out horses . . . but refused to hire them out other than in the order he chose. The
choice his customers were given was ‘this or none’; quite literally, Hobson’s choice.”); see also Gerald
B. Dworkin, Compulsion and Moral Concepts, 78 ETHICS 227, 230 (1968) (“Henry Ford was
supposed to have offered his customers a choice of colors—black.”).
49. See, e.g., John H. Garvey, Control Freaks, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 8 (1998) (arguing that
“freedoms are rights to go in some ways and not others” and that the freedom to live does not include a
freedom to die); Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional “Right to Die”? When Is There No
Constitutional “Right to Live”?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203 (1991) (similar).
Constitutional doctrine has struggled to draw clear lines with regard to the rights to live and die.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (arguably suggesting a right to “life”); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) (finding no right to physician-assisted suicide). But see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) (assuming that in some circumstances there is a right to refuse
medical care).
50. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (basing right to contraception in notions
of privacy and autonomy, and finding that the Due Process Clause protects the right to choose
“whether to bear or beget a child”); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977)
(describing Eisenstadt as establishing “the constitutional protection of individual autonomy” with
regard to “childbearing”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting
Eisenstadt and finding that its reasoning protects the choice to either continue or terminate a
pregnancy).
51. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979).
52. The exploration of rights and correlative duties is credited to Wesley Hohfeld. See
generally Hohfeld, supra note 21 (describing framework of jural conceptions); see also Walter
Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld’s Contributions to the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721, 723–29 (1919). It is
a matter of some debate whether constitutional rights are Hohfeldian “privileges” or “rights.” See
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions,
90 GEO. L.J. 1, 33 n.135 (2001) [hereinafter Berman, Coercion Without Baselines] (exploring the
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Protection rights guarantee only not-X, and therefore prohibit government
coercion but not government restraint. Protection rights are closely related to
option rights in that they operate in only one direction. But whereas option
rights achieve their goals by guaranteeing desirable actions and processes,
protection rights do so by prohibiting undesirable ones. Many procedural rights
are protection rights, forbidding the government to impose a process but
permitting the government to withhold it. The Eighth Amendment, for
example, gives people the right to refuse cruel and unusual punishment, not the
right to insist on it.53 Substantive protection rights are rare, but the Thirteenth
Amendment might be an example; it creates a right against slavery but no
corresponding right to be a slave.54
These three frameworks—and the dichotomy between X and not-X on
which they are based—are simple to describe, but deceptively difficult to
apply. Two points in particular are likely to cause confusion. First, a right to
not-X is a right to refuse X, not a right to do everything besides X, nor to do the
“opposite” of X. The difference is significant, but discussions of rights often
blur it. For example, John Garvey criticizes what he calls “bilateral” rights,
which are roughly analogous to what this Article calls choice rights.55
According to Garvey, “It is axiomatic in modern constitutional law that
freedoms are bilateral rights. . . . This axiom supports a curious form of
argument that may be unique to the jurisprudence of freedoms. In form it is
this: ‘If I may do x, then I may do not-x.’”56
This is indeed a curious form of argument. But it is different from the
conception of choice rights described here, which, to borrow Garvey’s
terminology, takes the form “If I may do x, then I may not do x.” The
difference between these is precisely the difference between having a right
against restraint of not-X and a right against coercion of X—a right to do
everything that is not speech and a right not to speak, for example.57 The latter
are the focus of this Article, and actually seem to be the real focus of Garvey’s
criticism as well. Elsewhere, he explains that “the idea that freedoms are
bilateral” means “that the freedom to do x entails the freedom not to do x.”58
This, rather than the “right to do not-X,” is the type of right not to that appears
difference and endorsing the latter view). The argument of this Article does not depend on whether
that is in fact the best reading of Hohfeld.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
54. See infra Part II.C.1. Of course, one might also characterize the Thirteenth Amendment as
requiring freedom, rather than prohibiting slavery. Part II.D discusses the characterization issue in
more detail.
55. GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 17.
56. Id. at 39.
57. One might say that refusing to speak is, in fact, the same thing as engaging in nonspeech.
The two will often overlap, but that does not mean that all nonspeech is protected, as the “right to do
not-X” would suggest.
58. GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 17.
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in American constitutional law, and which this Article explores. One might
argue about whether the “opposite” of the right to a jury of one’s peers is a jury
of nonpeers or no jury at all. But that debate, interesting as it may be, involves
a fundamentally different question than whether a person should be able to
refuse a jury of his peers. Resolution of the latter does not depend on the
answer to the former.
The second easy misconception about rights not to is that they are the
same thing as waivable rights. They are not. Waiving the right to do X means
giving up freedom from restraint, not gaining freedom from coercion.59 Waiver
therefore gives a person autonomy with regard to the legal act of claiming a
right to X, but not with regard to X itself. If X is a procedural protection, a
person who waives his or her right to X has declined to demand it but cannot
necessarily refuse it. Consider the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy
trial. It is clearly a “right to” (i.e., a procedural option right), in that it imposes a
duty on government to provide a speedy trial.60 It might also be waivable,
which means that a criminal defendant can release the government from that
duty.61 But that does not mean that it includes the right to refuse a speedy trial,
because releasing the government from its duty to provide a speedy trial does
not thereby create a separate duty on the part of the government to provide a
slow one.62
This method of viewing the inquiry—in terms not only of what rights
guarantee but also what they prohibit—illuminates the content of the rights
themselves. Because rights generally exist in order to check or prevent
particular abuses by government, it is useful to begin not only “with an
abstractly conceived account of what it is to be free, but with awareness of, and
attendance to, the kinds of pressures, restraints, constraints, etc., to which
human beings are, or can be subjected.”63 This second lens helps bring into
focus the functions of the various rights frameworks. Again, the relationship
can be stated simply: rights to and not to prevent two different kinds of
government interference with individual freedom—restraint and coercion.
Rights to X prevent the government from restraining activity or denying
process; rights to not-X prevent the government from coercing activity or
compelling process. As with X and not-X, these can be combined in three
59. Even waiving the right to a particular procedure does not give a person the right to refuse it,
because “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist
upon the opposite of that right.” Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1965) (upholding federal
rule requiring government consent in order for criminal defendant to waive right to a jury trial).
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
61. See Mazzone, supra note 18, at 831 n.194 (“The Court has also not determined whether the
right to a speedy trial may be waived, and the courts of appeals have differed on this issue.”).
62. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 (1979) (“[A] defendant cannot convert
his right to a speedy trial into a right to compel an indefinite postponement . . . .”).
63. D.M. White, Negative Liberty, 80 ETHICS 185, 185 (1970).
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relevant ways, which correspond to the three frameworks discussed above.
Option rights prevent government restraint, protection rights prevent
government coercion, and choice rights prevent both restraint and coercion.
Restraints are government actions that prohibit, punish, or constrain an
activity, or deny or withhold a particular process. Restraint is perhaps the most
intuitive, common, and recognizable form of government interference with
individual liberty; it has certainly received more scholarly and judicial attention
than other forms of government interference.64 State actions that punish or
prevent activities are restraints on conduct. State actions that deny a procedural
protection—the right to counsel, say—are restraints on process. Coercions, by
contrast, are government actions that compel individuals to do activity X or
receive process X. State actions that force people to engage in particular
activities are coercions of conduct. State actions that compel people to accept a
specific process—a jury of their peers, for example—are coerced process.
The taxonomy set out above and explored throughout the remainder of
this Part serves many functions. As Part II.D describes in detail, it illustrates
complicated issues regarding the definition of rights and the relationship
between restraint and coercion. But even the act of identifying different forms
of rights and their relationship to one another helps advance the essential,
ongoing quest for definitional rigor and clarity in the law.65 Sometimes a right
may allow a person to select X, sometimes to refuse it, and sometimes to do
either. These are different types of freedom, and as the discussion above
demonstrates, one does not necessarily entail the others. Identifying whether a
right is a choice, option, or protection right is therefore as essential as knowing
the “roads along which a man can decide to walk”66 and whether those roads
64. Cf. ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY
4 (1986) (“The blame for undue concentration on external obstacles to the exercise of autonomy is
largely to be attributed to the negative model of liberty.”).
65. See Andrew Halpin, More Comments on Rights and Claims, 10 LAW & PHIL. 271, 298–99
(1991) (“[I]t is of importance . . . to recognise the different kinds of legal rights. For else the ambiguity
of some vague general sense of a right, albeit capable of spreading comprehensively over every
instance of a legal right, will confuse one legal position with another, and will promote dispute at law
at the very point where the law should curtail dispute . . . .”); see also Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (“[T]he law cannot hope to sustain [its]
compound burden of stability, flexibility, and transparency unless it pays scrupulous attention to its
own taxonomy . . . . The law simply could not be understood unless it took care to classify itself
‘methodically.’ If it did not properly understand itself, its decision-making would be erratic and
doomed to ridicule.”) (quoting Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 O.J.L.S. 1, 3 (2000)).
66. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xxxix (1969); see also Isaiah Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY 369, 385 n.9
(Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 2006) (“[T]he extent of my freedom seems to depend
on . . . how many possibilities are open to me (although the method of counting these can never be
more than impressionistic. Possibilities of action are not discrete entities like apples, which can be
exhaustively enumerated) . . . .”); Philip Pettit, Agency-Freedom and Option-Freedom, 15 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 387, 387 (2003) (describing the argument “that social freedom is a function of
how much choice a person is left by his or her overall context, human and natural”).
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are open to one-way or two-way traffic.67 The following Parts identify and
explore those roads, which are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1: Taxonomy
Category
Protect
Prevent
Substantive
examples
Procedural
examples

Choice rights
X and not-X
Restraint and
coercion
Speech, religious
practice
Counsel in
criminal cases

Option rights
X, but not not-X
Restraint, but not
coercion
The right to life
(arguably)
Speedy and public
trial

Protection rights
Not-X, but not X
Coercion, but not
restraint
Prohibition on slavery
Prohibition on cruel
and unusual
punishments

II.
THREE TYPES OF RIGHTS TO AND NOT TO
A. Choice Rights: Rights To and Not To
Choice rights protect both X and not-X by prohibiting both restraint and
coercion of X. They are therefore rights to and not to. Where X is a kind of
conduct, such as speech, choice rights give their bearers the freedom to choose
whether or not to do X. Where X is a kind of process, such as the right to
counsel, choice rights give their bearers the freedom to control the process by
either demanding or refusing X. This element of autonomy with regard to X is
what makes them choice rights.68 Option and protection rights, by contrast, do
not protect the right to choose, but only to do (or to not do).69
67. See GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 5 (using traffic metaphor to describe the
difference between “unilateral” and “bilateral” rights); see also Garvey, Control Freaks, supra note 49,
at 8 (“I think that freedoms are rights to go in some ways and not others. We might picture them as
one-way streets.”).
Joel Feinberg also adopts a transportation theme, referring to freedom as a “maze of railroad
tracks” with multiple switches, each permitting a person to choose one direction or another. JOEL
FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 30, 36
(1980) (reprinting his 1978 essay The Interest in Liberty on the Scales).
68. Choice is often said to be the essence of autonomy. See, e.g., David Luban, Partisanship,
Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1004, 1036 (1990) (“Autonomy is a hard concept to define, but as a first cut at its intuitive
meaning we may say that autonomy means doing what one wants—choosing freely without outside
constraints.”).
This Article relies primarily on a choice conception of autonomy, though of course autonomy can
mean very different things in other contexts. The concept has been linked to liberty, “dignity, integrity,
individuality, independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge,” GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 6 (1988), among many other things. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 877 (1994) (describing “descriptive” and “ascriptive”
senses of autonomy); Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy After Washington v. Glucksberg: An
Essay About Abortion, Death, and Crime, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 436–37 (1998)
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A crucial function of choice rights is to protect both X and not-X—a fact
so basic that it might at times disappear from view. A right to associate that did
not also encompass the right not to associate, for example, is almost hard to
imagine. The NAACP, it seems, simply must have a right to exclude members
of the KKK. And yet as essential as this “to or not to” characteristic appears to
be, it is not axiomatically true of all rights. Indeed, it seems equally
inconceivable that other rights would protect choice. With few exceptions,
criminal defendants cannot refuse the procedures the Constitution
enumerates—speedy and public trials, for example. The fact that association is
treated as a choice right is therefore a fundamental, but not inevitable,
characteristic.
Part of the purpose of this Article is to show that these are design
alternatives, and that current classifications are significant but not
predetermined. After all, the Court did not explicitly recognize the existence of
a right “not to associate” until 1985,70 and in some limited circumstances it has
recognized criminal procedural guarantees as choice rights as well. The
following Sections explore the realm of substantive and procedural choice
rights and the contexts of their development.
1. Substantive Choice Rights
Nearly all substantive rights are choice rights. That is, almost every right
to engage in an activity encompasses the freedom to choose whether or not to
engage in that activity. As explored above, this includes the major First
Amendment rights, such as freedom of speech,71 free exercise of religion,72 and
freedom of association.73 Other substantive rights might also belong on the list
of choice rights but have never appeared there for the simple reason that the
state rarely compels the activities they protect. Sexual intimacy between adults,

(“Autonomy speaks volumes, and volumes have been justly spoken about it. It is variously understood
to mean consent, freedom of choice, the ability to act independently of others, and selfdetermination.”) (internal citations omitted).
69. Garvey, Control Freaks, supra note 49, at 1 (“If I had to state [the theory I reject] in one
sentence, it would be this: freedom is a right to make choices.”).
70. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
71. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
72. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The government may not compel
affirmation of religious belief, punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false,
impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, or lend its power to one or
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.”) (internal citations omitted); see also
Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the
First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 810–11 (1978) (“[I]ndividual decisions are to be protected
whether they operate for or against the validity of any or all religious views.”).
73. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“Thus, ‘[f]reedom of
association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.’”) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
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for example, is at least an option right.74 Presumably there is also a right not to
be sexually intimate—surely it would be unconstitutional for the state to force
people to have sex—but fortunately courts have had no real reason to
investigate the question.
Why are many substantive rights treated as choice rights? Part III
addresses this question in more detail, but the answer seems to lie, in large part,
with the fact that our notions of free action are deeply intertwined with
commitments to autonomy and choice.75 The Supreme Court’s substantive due
process jurisprudence, for example, often refers to choice—not “merely”
freedom from restraint—as an essential element of constitutional liberty. In
Meyer v. Nebraska,76 an early precursor of substantive due process, the Court
emphasized that “[w]ithout doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual . . . generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.”77
Fifty years later, Justice Douglas picked up a similar thread, arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects “freedom of choice in the basic decisions
of one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the
education and upbringing of children.”78 The same theme also appeared in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,79 which extended constitutional protection to “the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”80 The plurality in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey81 similarly concluded:
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter. . . . These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make

74. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
75. See infra Part III.B.1.
76. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
77. Id. at 399. Similarly, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court endorsed the idea that
liberty means more than freedom from restraint: “The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth]
amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his
person, . . . the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his
faculties . . . .” 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
Notably, the specific instantiation of the right to privacy at issue in Meyer—to educate one’s
children—is an option right rather than a choice right, as demonstrated by the existence of compulsory
education laws. I nevertheless hold aside any extended discussion of education, because it seems to be
tied up with the age of the person being educated. That is, children have an option right to an education
(and their parents an option right to educate them), while adults probably have a choice right to their
own education. The difference, I think, has more to do with age than education, and for clarity’s sake I
do not want to introduce another distinction here.
Many thanks to Ash Bhagwat for emphasizing this point, and pressing me to consider it.
78. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
79. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
80. Id. at 453.
81. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.82
These and other cases enshrine a right against both restraint and coercion of
particular activities. They therefore protect autonomy—the freedom to
choose—with regard to those activities.
2. Procedural Choice Rights
A procedural choice right gives its bearer the freedom to either demand or
refuse a particular type of process or treatment by the government. Such rights
are rare.
The only prominent example of a procedural choice right is the Sixth
Amendment’s “assistance of counsel” guarantee, which gives criminal
defendants the right to proceed either with or without counsel at trial.83 As the
Court has explained, this amounts to “constitutional protection of the
defendant’s free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
proceeding.”84 This explanation explicitly places the intrinsic value of personal
autonomy and dignity above the instrumental values the right might otherwise
serve: “The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of
the accused.”85
The right to refuse counsel, however, stands alone as a procedural choice
right, despite arguments by scholars and some Justices that defendants should
have autonomous control over their trials. Faretta suggested that “[t]he
language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the
other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing
defendant—not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling
defendant and his right to defend himself personally.”86 But in fact the “other
defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment” have not been treated as choice
rights. To the contrary, the Court has specifically held that the Amendment’s
guarantees of a speedy and public trial cannot be refused.87 Similarly,
“although [a defendant] can waive his right to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, it has never been seriously suggested that he can thereby compel

82. Id. at 847, 851.
83. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). The same cannot be said of appeal, where
criminal defendants can be required to accept court-appointed counsel. See Martinez v. Court of
Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (“[W]e conclude that neither the holding nor the reasoning in
Faretta requires California to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal
from a criminal conviction.”).
84. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984).
85. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984); see also Martinez, 528 U.S. at 160
(“[T]he Faretta majority found that the right to self-representation at trial was grounded in part in a
respect for individual autonomy.”).
86. 422 U.S. at 820.
87. See infra Part II.B.2.
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the Government to try the case by stipulation.”88 Nor is there a constitutional
right to be absent from one’s own trial.89 In other words, no “rights not to”
accompany these Sixth Amendment rights.
The availability of plea bargaining raises interesting questions about
procedural choice rights, for in some sense pleading guilty appears to be the
ultimate not-X with regard to criminal procedure rights: a refusal to accept
counsel, or indeed a trial of any kind. But despite their commonality, pleas are
not the not-X right one might suppose. For although “[i]n the vast majority of
cases . . . the decision whether to plead guilty is entirely the defendant’s,”
criminal defendants “do not technically have the right to plead guilty; the judge
may refuse, under some circumstances, to accept the defendant’s plea.”90 Some
scholars have argued for recognition of just such a right—invoking Faretta, the
“personal” nature of Sixth Amendment rights, and the importance of defendant
autonomy.91 But Faretta aside, the Court has been reluctant to endorse this or
any other version of procedural choice rights.92
It is tempting to explain the Court’s reluctance based on the fact that
procedural choice rights would effectively permit criminal defendants to
require the government to provide some good or service—precisely the kind of
rights-claim frowned upon in our system of “negative” liberty.93 Recognizing
such rights would allow defendants to place demands on the government, and
“[s]uch positive assistance is in deep tension with the idea of rights as
entitlements to autonomy, or as trumps.”94 But that cannot be a sufficient
explanation, for all process rights place demands on government resources. The
right to a jury trial or to the assistance of counsel, for example, may force the
88. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965).
89. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 permits waiver of the presence requirement, but
neither Rule 43 nor the Sixth Amendment standing alone confer a right to do so. See, e.g., In re United
States, 597 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing judicial discretion to accept or refuse waiver of
appearance); United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979) (same).
90. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1917 n.24 (1992); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970) (“A criminal
defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the
court, . . . although the States may by statute or otherwise confer such a right.”).
91. See, e.g., Barry J. Fisher, Judicial Suicide or Constitutional Autonomy? A Capital
Defendant’s Right to Plead Guilty, 65 ALB. L. REV. 181, 187 (2001) (“This view is consistent with the
Sixth Amendment’s antecedent right to a jury trial as a ‘right or privilege of the accused,’ rather than
‘as a part of the structure of government.’”) (internal citation omitted).
92. Scholars have, too. See Hashimoto, supra note 30, at 1150 n.8 (“There are relatively few
articles supporting the constitutional autonomy interest of criminal defendants.”).
93. See CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110–12 (1978) (defining a negative right as “the
right not to be wronged intentionally in some specified way,” while “a positive right is a claim
to . . . some [specified share of] good[s]”); see also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th
Cir. 1983) (concluding that U.S. Constitution “is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties”).
94. ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 25 (2010); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The
Rhetoric and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 277 (2010).
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government to spend vast amounts of money.95 Indeed, the very function of a
process right is to provide some government “benefit” (such as court-appointed
counsel) as a result of, or predicate to, government action (such as a criminal
prosecution).
The scarcity of procedural choice rights seems to be a function of the very
purpose of procedural rights. Unlike protections for individual action,
procedural rights generally exist to promote system interests—legitimacy,
certainty, and so on—that are in some sense beyond the control of the
rightsholder. Part III.B.1 explores this distinction in more detail.
B. Option Rights: Rights To
Whereas choice rights guarantee both X and not-X by prohibiting both
restraint and coercion, option rights guarantee only X by prohibiting only
restraint. Substantive option rights entitle their bearers to do X but not to refuse
to do so. Procedural option rights permit their bearers to receive X but not to
decline it.
If the main function of a choice right is to protect the choice between X
and not-X, the main function of an option right is to enable or guarantee X
alone. A person with an option right is therefore free to do or receive X, but not
to refuse to do or accept it. Sometimes a person can waive her right to X,
meaning that she is free not to insist on it. This gives the rightsholder some
measure of autonomy with regard to X. But as explained above,96 that is not the
same as having a right to not-X, because it does not include a freedom to
refuse. If the government seeks to coerce X rather than restrain it, an option
right is no defense.
As explained in Part II.B.2, option rights operate like one-way streets that
permit people to move toward some vision of the good, rather than protecting
autonomous choice for its own sake. And if constitutional rights exist in order
to promote the good—a contested but not indefensible position97—then it
seems plausible that enumerating X as a good worth protecting should not
necessarily give people the ability to invoke that right so as to refuse that good.
The right to a public trial, for example, does more than just protect the
autonomy of the accused. It also allows the public to see that the defendant “is
fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned,” incentivizes the “judge and
prosecutor [to] carry out their duties responsibly,” “encourages witnesses to
come forward,” and “discourages perjury.”98 These values are not coextensive
95. See, e.g., Rob Nagle, Public Defender Costs Come Under Scrutiny, EXAMINER (S.F.), May
26, 2011, http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/public-defender-costs-come-under-scrutiny (noting that in
2010 San Francisco’s Superior Court spent $10,600,000 providing attorneys to indigent defendants).
96. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
97. This is, of course, Garvey’s position. See GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 2.
98. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
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with the interests of the individual on trial. It therefore stands to reason that the
individual should not have complete control over whether the trial is public.
Despite this intuitive appeal, option rights also raise significant
complications. After all, if the purpose of rights is to permit people to pursue
the good, why not simply require them to do so?99 That would seem antithetical
to our notions of liberty,100 but option rights do not preclude it. One could
perhaps add the proviso that the good is only good when it is freely chosen
rather than coerced. But that means making a concession to the importance of
autonomous choice, which is exactly what option rights seek to avoid. The
following Sections explore how the Court has struck this balance in the context
of specific substantive and procedural rights.
1. Substantive Option Rights
As noted above, nearly all substantive rights are choice rights. But one can
imagine—and arguably can find—examples of substantive option rights as
well: rights that guarantee freedom from restraint but not from coercion.
Indeed, some of the most crowded and bitter battles in American constitutional
law center on whether particular substantive freedoms should be understood as
choice rights or option rights.
John Garvey has given the most full-throated defense of substantive
option rights, which he calls “unilateral rights.” Garvey argues that rights exist
in order to promote the good,101 and that their scope can and should be
understood with that instrumental aim in mind: “Suppose that it is good to do x.
That does not mean that it is good not to do x. If freedom follows the good, we
should be free to do x. But that does not mean that we should be free not to do
x.”102 Of course, what counts as “good” will inevitably be disputed.103 But
99. See Dennis J. Goldford, Response to Professor Garvey, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 105, 107
(1998) (“If the highest value in [Garvey’s] theory is that we do good things, is there any logical,
principled stopping point in his position which would forestall the argument that government should
enforce goodness?”).
100. CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 17 (2007)
[hereinafter FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY] (“The greatest enemy of liberty has always been some vision
of the good.”).
101. See GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that this argument “inverts the first
principle of liberalism—it makes the good prior to the right”); see also Steve Sheppard, Freedom To
and Freedom From: A Response to Garvey and Armacost with a Tinge of Legal Perfectionism, 47
DRAKE L. REV. 65, 67 (1998) (describing Garvey’s theory as holding that “[a]cts that lack the purpose
of a given freedom do not deserve protection by it”); Gregory C. Sisk, Stating the Obvious: Protecting
Religion for Religion’s Sake, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 45, 45 (1998) (celebrating as “obvious” and correct
“Garvey’s observation that our identification, interpretation, and application of constitutional rights
should include an understanding of the purpose of those rights”). Contra JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 31 (1971) (“[T]he concept of right is prior to that of the good.”).
102. GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 40.
103. See LAWRENCE CROCKER, POSITIVE LIBERTY: AN ESSAY IN NORMATIVE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 9 (1980) (“To attempt a ‘value neutral’ account of liberty is at best only superficially
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option rights are distinct from choice rights precisely because they do not treat
autonomy as a dominant value, and as a result do not ensure the right not to
engage in the enumerated activity or process. They guarantee actions or
processes, but not choice.104
Garvey illustrates his argument for “unilateral” rights with examples
drawn—roughly, at least—from constitutional doctrine. For example, he argues
that the Due Process Clause, which suggests the existence of a right to “life,”105
does not give people a right to choose death. The right to life, on this account,
prevents the government from restraining a person’s ability to live, but permits
the government to coerce a person into doing so. It is therefore a substantive
option right that serves the “virtue of courage,” prevents harms to others, and
preserves human dignity.106
Whether current doctrine supports this characterization of life as an option
right is a more difficult question.107 Washington v. Glucksberg,108 which
involved a constitutional challenge to a Washington statute barring physicianassisted suicide, is the closest the Supreme Court has come to determining
whether the right to live carries with it a right not to live. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down the Washington statute, finding that
the right to life included the freedom to “determin[e] the time and manner of

more sensible than to give a ‘biology neutral’ account of fish.”); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 19 (1999) (“[C]laims of rights are inescapably normative, because rights are
always interpreted according to some vision of the good or set of substantive political commitments.”).
104. See Barbara E. Armacost, Constitutional Remedies and the Morality of Governmental
Action: A Response to Garvey, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 19, 19 (1998) (describing Garvey’s view as being
that “the American system is not about the freedom to choose but about the freedom to act”); Alan E.
Brownstein, The Right Not to Be John Garvey, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 769 (1998) (“Garvey
concedes that freedoms can serve several overlapping interests. His argument seems to reject only one
justification for constitutionally protected freedoms: that of protecting personal autonomy.”) (internal
citations omitted).
105. To be precise, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments say only that people must not be
deprived “of life . . . without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV. But this language
has been read to imply a preexisting right to life, and that such a right is undoubtedly “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.” Cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion). In any event, the Court has recognized that substantive due process protects “bodily
integrity,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997), which is presumably broad enough to
encompass the right to remain alive. And of course the right to life, like all rights, is a right against the
government—that is, a (nonabsolute) right not to be killed by the government.
106. See Garvey, Control Freaks, supra note 49, at 13 (arguing, inter alia, that “living out the
virtue of courage is an act, or more precisely an attitude, that is good in itself”); id. at 15–17 (arguing
that suicide is not a self-regarding act, and that it impacts concepts of human dignity and the lives of
others).
107. Part of the complication comes from the fact that the “right to die” can encompass many
different things—passive euthanasia, suicide, assisted suicide, and active voluntary euthanasia—each
of which raises different constitutional concerns. See Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The
Last Bridge to Active Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 225, 225 (John Keown ed., 1995).
108. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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one’s own death.”109 A “philosophers’ brief” filed with the Supreme Court by
Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon,
and Judith Jarvis Thompson supported this conclusion, arguing for “a very
general moral and constitutional principle—that every competent person has
the right to make momentous personal decisions which invoke fundamental
religious or philosophical convictions about life’s value for himself.”110 This
would have effectively meant a substantive choice right with regard to life. The
Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit, rejecting a right to assisted
suicide.111
Garvey claims that Glucksberg is a vindication of life as a unilateral (i.e.,
option) right.112 But the Court’s decision was not solely based on the notion
that the good precedes and thereby creates the right. Rather, the Justices
concluded that assisted suicide is not a fundamental right because it is not
grounded in American tradition, and that Washington’s ban was rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose113: “The decision to commit suicide
with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar
legal protection.”114 This reasoning does not rule out the possibility of a right to
choose death, only the right to do so with a doctor’s help. Indeed, in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health,115 decided just a few years before
Glucksberg, the Court noted that its past decisions support the inference “that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment.”116 This suggests that life is a choice right, even if
obtaining a doctor’s assistance in ending it is not.
But whether or not it is descriptively true to say that life is an option right,
the underlying argument is straightforward: constitutional rights can, and
arguably sometimes do, prohibit government restraints of conduct without
prohibiting government coercion of conduct. Although (or because) this
argument places the concept of the good above that of personal autonomy, it is
not an altogether unsatisfying account. But just as the Supreme Court has

109. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
110. Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
March 27, 1997, at 1; see also Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 708956.
111. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735–36.
112. Garvey, Control Freaks, supra note 49, at 1 (“[T]he Court’s understanding of freedom is
similar to the one I propose . . . and the theory it rejects is the one I am most concerned to combat.”).
113. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728, 735.
114. Id. at 725.
115. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
116. Id. at 278. See also Shepherd, supra note 68, at 432–33 n.13 (emphasizing that Cruzan
merely assumed, and did not create, a constitutional right to reject medical care).
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generally rejected calls for procedural choice rights, so too has it generally
rejected arguments for substantive option rights.
2. Procedural Option Rights
Whereas most substantive rights are choice rights, nearly all procedural
rights are option rights. They permit their bearers to demand a particular
procedural protection but not necessarily to refuse it. The government may not
deny such processes, but can impose them on unwilling individuals.
The rights to a speedy and public trial are good examples of procedural
option rights. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the option
of a speedy and public trial, but does not give them autonomous control over
their trials’ speed or publicity. In other words, the government must provide a
criminal defendant a speedy trial if requested, but need not honor a defendant’s
request for a slow or private trial. The Court concluded as much in Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale,117 albeit seemingly in dicta.118 Distinguishing Faretta on the
basis that its result was driven largely by the word “assistance” in the text of
the Sixth Amendment, the Court concluded that “[w]hile the Sixth Amendment
guarantees to a defendant in a criminal case the right to a public trial, it does
not guarantee the right to compel a private trial.”119 Similarly, the Court held
that “a defendant cannot convert his right to a speedy trial into a right to
compel an indefinite postponement . . . .”120 As noted above,121 the Court has
reached the same conclusion with regard to other criminal procedure
guarantees, such as the right to a jury trial.
And yet there are those who question this state of affairs and argue that, as
in Faretta, the principle of defendant autonomy should animate the Court’s
criminal procedure jurisprudence.122 These arguments have traditionally—and
often successfully—focused on expanding defendants’ ability to waive certain
rights. The Court now evaluates the waivability of criminal procedure rights
against a “background presumption that legal rights . . . are subject to waiver by
voluntary agreement of the parties.”123 But as noted above, waiving a right to
demand does not necessarily give a person a right to refuse, for the simple
reason that releasing the government from its duty to provide X does not create

117. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
118. As the Court noted, “the issue here is not whether the defendant can compel a private trial.
Rather, the issue is whether members of the public have an enforceable right to a public trial that can
be asserted independently of the parties in the litigation.” Id. at 382–83.
119. Id. at 382.
120. Id. at 384.
121. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra note 30, at 1163 (“The history of the Constitution, and in
particular the history of the Sixth Amendment, strongly suggests that the autonomy interest recognized
in Faretta underlies many of the Constitution’s criminal trial rights.”).
123. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995).
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a corresponding duty not to provide X. In Singer v. United States,124 for
example, a criminal defendant argued that he had a right to insist on a trial
without a jury—that the right to a jury trial was a choice right. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, saying that “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional
right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of
that right.”125 And in Gannett, the question was not whether the defendant
could waive his rights to a speedy and public trial but rather whether the
government could, notwithstanding his waiver, force him to have a speedy and
public trial. Option rights permit the government to do exactly that.
C. Protection Rights: Rights Not To
The final framework consists of protection rights, which guarantee not-X
without guaranteeing X itself. They therefore prohibit coercion of X but not
restraint of it. Protection rights are closely related to option rights in that they
operate in only one direction and are concerned with values other than
individual autonomy. But whereas option rights guarantee people freedom to
pursue the good, protection rights guarantee people freedom from being forced
into the bad.
1. Substantive Protection Rights
Substantive protection rights give their bearers the right to refuse to do
something, but not the right to do it. They therefore forbid the government to
coerce a particular activity, but do not forbid (and sometimes require) the
government to restrain it.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery is the best example
of a substantive protection right. It limits the government’s power to coerce
slavery but does not limit the government’s power to restrain it. In fact, because
the Amendment’s guarantees cannot be waived, the government is effectively
required to restrain slavery: “Slavery is forbidden whether or not a person
‘consented’ to it.”126 This is demonstrated most clearly by the peonage cases, in
which the Court invalidated on Thirteenth Amendment grounds state statutes
requiring compulsory service as payment for private debts.127 In doing so, the
Court made it clear that the amendment does not confer a right to be a slave,

124. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
125. Id. at 34–35. Though it referred to “insist[ing] upon the opposite” of a right, the Court
clearly meant refusing the right to a jury trial.
126. Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1386 (1984); id. at 1387–88 (“The burden of the [T]hirteenth
[A]mendment was not only the protection of individual liberty, but the eradication of a social practice
deemed incompatible with a free society.”).
127. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243–44 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197
U.S. 207, 217–18 (1905).
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even voluntarily. (This of course raises interesting questions about whether
choosing slavery can ever be a valid exercise of autonomy.128)
As explained below in Part II.D, the distinction between option and
protection rights is not always as clear as the line separating option/protection
rights from choice rights. One might ask, therefore, whether the Thirteenth
Amendment should instead be characterized as a guarantee of freedom—an
option right. This is logically plausible; the legal impact would be precisely the
same. And yet the language, history, and understanding of the amendment
support the protection right characterization. It is, after all, phrased in
prohibitory terms, and has long been understood by the Court as forbidding
coercion and compulsion.129 Those very characteristics make it a protection
right.
2. Procedural Protection Rights
Procedural protection rights enumerate processes that people cannot be
forced to accept, but which the government can choose to (and sometimes
must) deny. Whereas the protection rights framework is all but an empty set
with regard to substantive rights, many procedural rights fall within its scope.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is
a particularly interesting example of a procedural protection right.130 The
amendment clearly permits rightsholders to refuse particular “procedures,” thus
making the Eighth Amendment a basic not-X right. Whether that not-X right is
waivable is an oddly unanswered question.131 If it is, then convicted criminals
can relieve the government of its duty not to impose a cruel and unusual

128. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13, 125 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859);
Kevin W. Saunders, The Role of Freedoms: An Introduction to the Symposium, 47 DRAKE L. REV. v, v
(1998) (“Mill . . . takes the position that each of us should be free to make self-regarding choices, and
that faced with such a choice, the government should not push us in either direction.”); see also infra
notes 237–39 and accompanying text (discussing Mill’s views on autonomy and slavery).
129. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 244–45; see also Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)
(interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment to reach “those forms of compulsory labor akin to African
slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results”); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 363 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting) (interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment to
reach “not merely . . . slavery” but “every other form of compulsory service . . .”).
130. At risk of reiterating my earlier disclaimer, see supra note 20, it is worth emphasizing that
by calling the Eighth Amendment “procedural” I do not mean to suggest that it is not “substantive,”
only that it limits a particular type of government action, rather than guaranteeing a particular type of
individual conduct.
131. The Court has never decided whether the Eighth Amendment right can be waived,
Mazzone, supra note 18, at 831 n.194, but every indication is that it cannot. See, e.g., Lenhard v.
Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Society’s independent stake in
enforcement of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment cannot be
overridden by a defendant’s purported waiver.”); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 154 (2008).
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punishment. But an Eighth Amendment choice right would be even stronger
than that: it would permit a person to insist on a cruel and unusual punishment.
This would be bizarre, and is certainly not the state of the law. But why?
If the purpose of rights is to protect individuals, what is wrong with permitting
individual rightsholders to select the manner of their punishment? Perhaps it
seems odd that an Eighth Amendment choice right would permit a person to
“compel” the government to do something it does not want to do. That sounds
like a positive right in the Berlinian sense—a duty on the part of government to
provide something to citizens. But it would not be different in that regard from
the Sixth Amendment, which requires the government to provide counsel to
indigent defendants.132 And in the context of both the Eighth and the Sixth
Amendments, the government could avoid its obligation simply by declining to
undertake the activity that triggers it—punishment or trial.
The real explanation, as explored in more detail in Part III, is that
procedural protection rights are not designed to protect individual choice. As
with procedural option rights, their purpose is to further some other
instrumental good, such as legitimacy, efficiency, or fairness.133
D. The Internal Structure of the Taxonomy
Despite its appealing balance and apparent symmetry, the taxonomy laid
out above illuminates difficult issues regarding the definition and content of
rights. One of the most problematic issues is the notion that rights to X and notX are preexisting categories that courts and scholars can choose to endorse or
not—a menu of predefined potential rights available for selection. In fact,
American constitutional rights are effectively created, not selected, by judicial
and social practice. As Richard Primus puts it, “[r]ights discourse . . . should be
understood as a coherent social practice, available to a wide range of political
agendas and including within its scope the political arguments of philosophers
as well as politicians, though more sophisticated in some contexts than
others.”134 This means that it is too simple to say that X and not-X preexist the
taxonomy and can simply be slotted into it as judges see fit. To the contrary,
the very act of defining X and not-X is interpretive. The same is true of restraint
and coercion. Judges, legal scholars, and philosophers have long struggled to
separate or even define the two.135 The lines between X and not-X (or between
132. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963).
133. Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 304 (2003) (“The
rationales justifying such limitations [on waiver] include: (1) the necessity of the rule for the system to
function initially; (2) the potential effects on others (including reliance); and (3) the unintentional
effects of interfering with a currently functioning and evolved system.”).
134. PRIMUS, supra note 103, at 5–6.
135. See generally Harry Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON
FREEDOM OF ACTION 65 (Ted Honderich ed., 1973) (attempting to define coercion); NOMOS XIV:
COERCION (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972) (same); Robert Nozick, Coercion, in
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restraint and coercion) are therefore part of rights discourse, not simply a result
of it.
These definitional difficulties manifest themselves, sometimes
unannounced, in constitutional doctrine and theory. Wooley v. Maynard136 is
illustrative. In that case, George Maynard was fined for covering up the words
“Live Free or Die” on his license plate.137 The District Court treated this as an
infringement of his right to express himself by covering up the words.138 The
Supreme Court, however, saw a violation of Maynard’s right not to express
himself: “Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces
an individual, as part of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering
public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”139
Which characterization of the case, and of the underlying right, is correct? Is
speech or silence the relevant X? Was Maynard being restrained or coerced?
Consider also the Dale scenario. If the government tells the Boy Scouts, “You
must accept homosexual members or else be disbanded,” what version of
association right is implicated? Is it a restraint of association, since it threatens
to prevent the Scouts from associating on their own terms? Is it coerced
association, since the Scouts are being told that they must associate with
homosexuals? Is it both a restraint and a coercion?
Answering these questions with precision requires some theory of
baselines—of how to compare an individual’s position before and after the
government acted. Such a theory has been the focus of many ardent140 but starcrossed141 judicial and scholarly quests. And so like many other distinctions in
constitutional law,142 the difference between restraint and coercion seems
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL: PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440 (Sidney
Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (same); see also Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra note 52,
at 12 (“The scholarship has concluded that coercion is a dead end.”).
136. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
137. Id. at 708.
138. See Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1976), aff’d, 430 U.S. 705
(1977) (“Since we accept plaintiffs’ contention that their acts constituted constitutionally protected
symbolic speech and that the state cannot prosecute them for masking the motto, we need not consider
whether their First Amendment right to be free from a required affirmation of belief is implicated.”).
139. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
140. Unconstitutional conditions doctrine played the role of Helen for many of these quests.
See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions,
State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988) (emphasizing efficiency concerns
and problems of monopoly, collective action, and externalities); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (1989) (emphasizing systemic and
distributional issues).
141. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra note 52, at 3 (“The Supreme Court’s failure
to provide coherent guidance on the subject is, alas, legendary.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions and the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 327, 328 (1989)
(“[The] notion [of coercion] is fatally elusive in unconstitutional conditions cases . . . .”).
142. The lines between state action and inaction or between speech and nonspeech spring to
mind.
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simultaneously foundational and elusive. Moreover, as Part III.A argues in
more detail, establishing that line is a fundamentally normative enterprise. As
Mitch Berman puts it, conclusions about coercion “are the product of
substantive normative judgments about the proper ways to secure human
freedom, and not the other way around.”143
Despite the difficulty of these quests, they cannot be abandoned, because
constitutional law and discourse continue to treat the characterization of a right
as significant. Courts and scholars generally recognize a distinction between
rights to and rights not to, even if they are not sure which of those rights is
threatened in a particular case. In Dale, for example, both parties argued, and
the Supreme Court held, that the Scouts’ effort to exclude homosexuals
involved an assertion of the right not to associate.144 Barnette, too, selfconsciously created a new “right not to speak,” rather than simply applying
existing First Amendment doctrine.145
But such a characterization does not solve the problems of distinguishing
between X and not-X, nor between restraint and coercion; it simply shows how
unavoidable these distinctions are. The essence of the difficulty lies not
necessarily in defining the line between X and not-X, nor in defining the line
between restraint and coercion, but rather in determining which side of the line
is the proper starting point. For example, restraint of the right to speak seems
identical to coercion of silence, and coercion of speech logically identical to
restraint of silence. The statements are equivalent; toggling between restraint
and coercion simply switches the valence of X to not-X or vice versa. But as
long as one element can be held constant, the other falls into place. That is, so
long as X is speech, not silence, then a gag rule is a restraint, not a coercion.
And as it turns out, the text of the Constitution—or at least the language of
constitutional discourse—does tend to identify most Xs relatively clearly. The
First Amendment, for example, refers to “speech,” not silence. And in most
cases, it is possible to tell the difference between restraining and coercing
speech. Nor is speech the only example. The identification of X is especially
straightforward with regard to procedural rights, most of which operate in only
one direction. The Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial “[i]n Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars . . . .”146 Having a jury trial is therefore X, and it is not particularly
difficult to tell the difference between granting and denying a jury trial.
143. Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45,
47 (2002); see also Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 140, at 1428 (“[A]ny useful
conception of coercion is irreducibly normative.”).
144. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
145. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (explicitly overruling
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)); id. at 643 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring)
(explaining “reasons for our change of view” since Gobitis).
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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And yet this is not necessarily a complete solution. For many rights,
constitutional and judicial phrasing do not help identify X. One might point out,
for example, that the First Amendment actually protects “the freedom of
speech,” so its text does not fully determine whether speech or silence should
count as X.147 The many rights that have no direct home in the Constitution’s
text—freedom of association, for example, or privacy—are even harder to deal
with. And if X cannot be established, then it is also impossible a priori to
differentiate between restraint and coercion (and, by extension, option and
protection rights). If restraint of the right to speak is identical to coercion of
silence, and coercion of speech is identical to restraint of silence, and there is
no way to determine which is the better phrasing, where does that leave the
trichotomy sketched above?
The best answer is that American rights discourse does, as a practical and
doctrinal matter, recognize speech rather than silence as the starting point for
First Amendment analysis, public trials rather than private trials as the focus of
the Sixth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment as prohibiting slavery rather
than requiring freedom, and so on. In other words, constitutional text and rights
discourse tend to identify an X—an activity or a procedure—and either
guarantee or prohibit it. In the vast run of cases, shared intuitions exist about
what counts as X and whether it is protected or prohibited.
But it is somewhat unsatisfying to rest an answer on an appeal to shared
intuitions, no matter how strong. So let us accept for the sake of argument that
it is impossible to determine whether a given right—even assuming that its
function can be identified—should be characterized as preventing restraint or
coercion of X. If that is so, then one part of the taxonomy above essentially
collapses: the division between option and protection rights, which is premised
on the difference between restraint and coercion. But this newly combined set
is still importantly distinct from choice rights, for even if it is impossible to
determine whether a right prohibits restraint or coercion, it is still possible to
determine whether it prohibits both. That is, a right against restraint of silence
does not necessarily create a right against coercion of speech, nor does a right
against coercion of silence create a right against restraint of speech.
Thus in its strongest form, the definitional difficulty essentially transforms
the trichotomy into a dichotomy—an analysis of one-way and two-way streets,
as it were. For the reasons given above, I do not believe that this is necessary;
rights discourse recognizes and supports a distinction between restraint and
coercion, and can identify most Xs without undue complication. But even the
dichotomy version of the taxonomy illustrates interesting and valuable lessons
about rights and rightsholders. All of the rights discussed here enumerate some
activity or procedure, X, that rightsholders are either entitled to or protected
147.

U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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from. The fundamental distinction between choice rights and option/protection
rights is that the holder of a choice right has control over X. It is a good in the
holders’ possession, not simply held in their name. The following Part
addresses the difficult question of how to determine whether any particular
right guarantees choice, an option, or protection with regard to X.
III.
JUSTIFYING RIGHTS TO AND NOT TO
Part II identified three basic types of constitutional rights—choice rights,
option rights, and protection rights—and explained how they work and what
differentiates them. This Part attempts to answer the second-order and perhaps
more difficult question of why these rights look the way they do, and how
particular rights should be classified into the three categories.
Part III.A argues that although this question of classification may appear
strictly analytic, it is in fact a deeply normative inquiry into the purposes and
values underlying particular rights. Despite the appealing symmetry of the
taxonomy laid out in Part II, the relationships among the categories it identifies
are in no sense inevitable. Whether a particular right protects choice depends
on the values associated with that right, not on acontextual analysis of the
relationship between rights to and not to. The taxonomy, in other words, is both
a result and a form of rights discourse.
But what kinds of arguments within that discourse have been or should be
effective in shaping the taxonomy? This is a difficult question to answer in the
abstract, since different rights quite naturally have been animated by different
values. Part III.B nevertheless identifies two broad approaches that have
descriptive and normative force.
First, a right can be classified as a choice or option/protection right based
on whether it is “public” or “personal.” When a right is designed to protect
social interests, it will almost always be considered an option or protection
right; one that the individual rightsholders cannot subvert by insisting on its
opposite. By contrast, when a right is designed to protect the interests of the
individual alone, it should generally, though not always, be considered a choice
right. Some personal rights are designed to protect the rightsholder’s autonomy
with regard to certain spheres of activity or procedures. These are choice rights.
Other personal rights have an instrumental justification besides autonomy—the
protection of dignity, for example. These instrumental personal rights generally
operate as option or protection rights.
Second, as the second normative framework shows, choice rights can
emerge even when a right is animated by values other than the protection of
individual autonomy. This can happen in at least three distinct ways. First, a
“right to” may depend on a concomitant “right not to” (or vice versa) in order
to function properly. For example, it is often argued that the right to associate
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would be meaningless without an accompanying right not to associate.148
Second, even if a right to and right not to could function independently of one
another, they might as a practical matter further the same constitutional value.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the Second Amendment should be interpreted in
this way, since its “core component” of self-defense is implicated both by the
decision to keep or bear arms and the decision not to.149 Finally, sometimes a
right to and right not to serve different constitutional values, both (or all) of
which are constitutionally salient. For example, the right to speak might be
protected as an incident of individual autonomy, while the right not to speak
might be protected because of the confusion and distortion that coerced speech
would inflict on listeners.150
The twin goals of this Part are to make sense of how rights are classified
and to enable evaluation of how they should be classified. Doing so helps
clarify the stakes in many of the most difficult and contentious debates in
constitutional law: whether the right to continue a pregnancy should include a
right not to, whether the right to life encompasses a right to die, and so on.
These are arguments about whether particular rights should be classified as
choice rights, option rights, or protection rights. The underlying issues in those
debates are, in turn, the normative issues discussed here: whether the rights at
issue are personal or public, whether autonomy has intrinsic value, whether
protecting the choice between X and not-X serves the rights’ underlying
purposes, and so on. It is of course impossible, here or anywhere, to provide
fully satisfactory or complete answers to these debates. But at the very least,
the analysis may help frame those debates by revealing what they are really
about.
A. The Inescapable Normativity of the Taxonomy
In determining whether particular rights to should encompass rights not
to, courts and scholars often employ the language of inevitability, as if the
relationship between the two can be deduced by formal logic. For example, in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court found that “[f]reedom of

148. See John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43
CONN. L. REV. 149, 154 (2010) (giving examples of groups that “sought to maintain an unpopular
composition and message in the face of antidiscrimination laws. Each was denied associational
protection. Each was forced to change its composition—and therefore its message. Each no longer
exists in the form it once held and desired to maintain”).
149. Blocher, supra note 24.
150. Compare C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989)
[hereinafter BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY] (justifying right to speak based on “respect for individual
integrity and autonomy”), with Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 979 (2009) (“Compelled speech . . . distorts the marketplace of ideas
and democratic decision-making by misrepresenting the views of speakers forced to propound a
viewpoint that is not their own.”).
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association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”151 And in Riley
v. National Federation of the Blind,152 the Court similarly concluded that
freedom of speech “necessarily compris[es] the decision of both what to say
and what not to say.”153 Scholarly investigations, too, often refer to rights to
and not to as if they are inseparable traveling companions.154
These arguments are not wrong. Logical relationships do exist between
various pairings of rights to and not to. But the logic of those relationships is
determined by the values or purposes underlying the rights themselves. For
example, it might be appealing to say, as many courts and commentators have,
that the right to associate simply must include the right not to associate. But
this is not true as a purely logical matter. The acts of associating and notassociating are neither identical nor interdependent. If the purpose of the
associational right were solely to permit people to gather—“assembly,” after
all, is the enumerated right that association has largely come to replace155—
then there would be nothing “necessary” nor even logical about a right to
exclude. Association would simply be an option right. And if the purpose of the
right were solely to permit groups to protect “certain intimate relationships”—
intimacy, after all, is one of the primary interests served by the right of
association156—then there would be less need to protect the right to associate.
Association would basically be a protection right.
These outcomes may seem unimaginable; the coexistent rights to and not
to associate have an air of inevitability about them. And indeed it is true to
some degree that the rights to associate and not associate must travel together.
But this is true only because of the values underlying association itself. In other
words, an option right of association would be meaningless only with regard to
particular purposes or values. As Seana Shiffrin explains, “The right of
association, if it is to protect the interests that underpin it, suggest[s] a
corresponding right to exclude unwanted members.”157 That statement captures
the issue perfectly: the relationship between rights to and not to is grounded in
the interests, values, and purposes underpinning them. Thus, in Dale, when the
Supreme Court found that “[f]orcing a group to accept certain members may
impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views,

151. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233–35 (1977).
152. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
153. Id. at 797.
154. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 40, at 596 n.57; McGinnis, supra note 40, at 528; Paulsen,
supra note 40, at 1922; Sullivan, supra note 40, at 248; Webber, supra note 40, at 506; Weinreb, supra
note 40, at 2295.
155. See John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 606–11
(2010).
156. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–20 (1984).
157. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 873 (emphasis added).
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that it intends to express,”158 it was basing its conclusion on a particular
constitutional value—expression.
Similarly, the freedom of speech “necessarily compris[es] the decision of
both what to say and what not to say”159 if that decision is necessary to the
autonomy of the speaker, the marketplace of ideas, or whatever other values
underlie the First Amendment. Indeed, speech can be and has been justified as
a choice right based on some of these underlying values. Edwin Baker, for
example, argued that “respect for individual integrity and autonomy requires
the recognition that a person has the right to use speech to develop herself or to
influence or interact with others in a manner that corresponds to her values.”160
He similarly concluded that “respect for the integrity and autonomy of the
individual usually requires giving each person at least veto power over the use
of her own body and, similarly, over her own speech.”161 Martin Redish has
argued similarly that free speech should be protected in part because of
individual autonomy interests,162 and that compelled speech interferes with
autonomy and the capacity for critical analysis.163 These arguments
demonstrate that many different visions of the First Amendment—and there
are, of course, many—can arrive at the same conclusion: that the right to speak
must include the right not to speak in order for the vision to be made real.
By contrast, other rights do not include a right not to, precisely because
such a not-X right would undermine their very reason for being. This is the case
with option and protection rights such as the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prohibition on slavery and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a public trial.
The purposes those rights serve would be subverted, not advanced, if a
rightsholder could refuse or demand X. The public trial right, for example,
protects not just the accused, but also the public, by ensuring public oversight
of judicial processes.164 Permitting a defendant to insist on a private trial would
undermine this function.
The language of inevitability and necessity can therefore mask the deeply
normative, value-laden debates that actually determine the classification of
various rights. The decision to treat a particular right to as carrying with it a
right not to is just that: a decision, one that is driven by the function of the

158. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
159. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
160. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 150, at 59.
161. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment, supra note 27, at 1000.
162. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593–94 (1982)
(arguing that the primary interest served by free speech is “individual self-realization,” which includes
but is not limited to “liberty” and “autonomy”).
163. Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment
Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1114–16
(1999).
164. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46–47 (1984).
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right, rather than by some mathematical relationship between X and not-X. This
is not to suggest, of course, that they are unrelated.165 But their relationship is
itself premised on substantive conclusions about their purposes or functions—
to further personal or public interests, to serve values that support both X and
not-X, and so on. The inevitability derives from the value of the right, not from
X alone. The taxonomy is therefore consistent with a conception of rights as
both enforceable rules and as a form of discourse and practice.166 As Richard
Primus explains, “Rights are bound up with needs, interests, and well-being,
the subject matter of political morality generally, and what propositions achieve
recognition as rights grows largely from our opinions about which of those
propositions are the most substantively deserving of the privileged status that
the label ‘rights’ bestows.”167
Recognizing that the taxonomy itself depends on contestable values and
practices helps explain another of its important features: the permeability of its
boundaries and the movement of rights within it. Rights, it turns out, are not
monogamously committed to one category or another, but rather move among
them—option rights evolving into choice rights, for example—as the
understanding of their underlying values changes. A few examples suffice to
illustrate the phenomenon.
At the time of the Founding, the constitutional guarantee of free speech
apparently was thought to prevent restraint, but not coercion; it was therefore
an option right, and permitted compelled speech like loyalty oaths. As Sandy
Levinson notes, “Loyalty oaths have been part of American history from its
(English) origins in the seventeenth century.”168 But “after a somewhat
checkered pattern of case law, the Court has proved quite hostile to most
loyalty oaths, though it has refused to reject them entirely.”169 The development
of the right not to speak is part of that story. In the 1940 decision Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,170 the Court rejected the argument that
schoolchildren had a First Amendment right not to salute the flag. Though the
case was presented as a Free Exercise Clause challenge, Justice Frankfurter’s 81 majority opinion went on to say that “[e]ven if it were assumed that freedom
165. Cf. GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 17 (asking rhetorically whether “[a]n act and its
contradictory, x and not-x, should be like binary stars, closer to each other than they are to anything
else”).
166. See Wilkinson, supra note 94, at 277 (arguing that “rights exist in two dimensions
simultaneously”—both as an ideal and in “positivist terms”—and that we should embrace this duality).
For more critical treatments of rights discourse, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); Thomas L. Haskell, The Curious Persistence of
Rights Talk in the “Age of Interpretation,” 74 J. AM. HIST. 984, 984 (1987).
167. PRIMUS, supra note 103, at 27.
168. Sanford Levinson, Constituting Communities Through Words That Bind: Reflections on
Loyalty Oaths, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1440, 1449 (1986).
169. Id. at 1451.
170. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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of speech goes beyond the historic concept of full opportunity to utter and to
disseminate views,” such a freedom could be abridged in the name of “national
cohesion” and “national unity.”171
Things changed just a few years later. The Court granted certiorari in
Barnette,172 a case with facts nearly identical to those of Gobitis, and proceeded
to make an about face, finding that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”173 The
right not to speak had been born.
While the mandatory pledges struck down in Barnette were not the end of
compelled speech in America,174 the case marked the critical moment that the
right not to speak fused with the free speech right, creating something akin to a
choice right. Indeed, the Court would soon treat the rights to and not to speak
as inseparable. As Chief Justice Burger wrote in Wooley, “The right to speak
and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the
broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”175 Justice Brennan
emphasized the same symmetry in Riley: “[T]he First Amendment guarantees
‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to
say and what not to say.”176 As a doctrinal matter, these are now true
statements. But their veracity reflects the resolution, perhaps temporary, of a
fundamentally normative debate about the value of speech.
Nor is speech the only example of such a progression. Free exercise of
religion, too, was not necessarily always understood to be a choice right.177 But

171. Id. at 595.
172. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
173. Id. at 642.
174. Loyalty oaths and other abuses of the McCarthy period were yet to come, and many courts
accepted their constitutionality. Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Thoughts About Citizen Lawyers, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1153, 1167 (2009) (“The McCarthy period was another period of witch hunts,
loyalty oaths, and worse. The Supreme Court (and the courts in general) did not exactly cover
themselves with glory.”). The Supreme Court itself upheld a National Labor Relations Board
requirement that union leaders sign “non-Communist affidavits.” Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950).
Of course, there is not necessarily anything constitutionally wrong with compelling speech
through the use of subpoena, as McCarthy and HUAC did, so long as the speech that is compelled is
not self-incriminating and does not require expression of a particular opinion. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at
645 (Murphy, J., concurring) (noting that the First Amendment protects a right not to speak “except
insofar as essential operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly
society,—as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court”). Many thanks to Josh Chafetz for
pushing me on this point.
175. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
176. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
177. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (“Perhaps in the early days of
the Republic [the religion clauses] were understood to protect only the diversity within Christianity,
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in Torcaso v. Watkins,178 the Court emphatically rejected—on both free speech
and free exercise grounds—the notion that political office could be conditioned
on religious oaths,179 thus indicating that free exercise also is a choice right.
And of course in Faretta, the Court concluded for the first time that the right to
assistance of counsel included the right to refuse counsel.180 That right, the
Court found, “exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused.”181
The normativity of these debates goes even deeper, to the question not
only of whether a right should protect choice, but what kinds of X or not-X
should be protected. As noted above, for the purposes of this Article, a right to
not-X simply means the right not to do or accept X. But of course such a right
can manifest itself in many different kinds of action, not all of which will
necessarily be protected. There are a near-infinite number of ways not to do
something, and recognizing the existence of a right to not-X does not mean
extending protection to all of these alternatives.
An example might help illustrate the point. Let X represent procreation.182
An option right to X, then, would be a right to procreate. In Buck v. Bell,183 the
Court effectively denied the existence of such a right, upholding a program of
compulsory sterilization for the “feeble-minded.”184 But in Skinner v.
Oklahoma,185 the Court struck down a law imposing sterilization as punishment
for certain categories of crimes. The Court found that it was “dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”186
The Court therefore effectively recognized an option right to procreate.187
This by itself did not establish whether other forms of government
interference with procreative freedom were also unconstitutional. After

but today they are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist,
or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism.’”) (citation omitted).
178. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
179. Id. at 495–96.
180. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
181. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984).
182. The very characterization of the following cases as involving “procreation rights” is of
course imperfect; I offer it here simply as one lens through which to view it. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383
(1985) (discussing equality and autonomy rationales).
183. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
184. Id. at 207.
185. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
186. Id. at 541.
187. Skinner was itself an equal protection case (the decision turned on whether different
groups of criminals were being treated unequally), but the Court clearly based its decision in part on
the “basic civil right[]” of procreation and the case has been cited as protecting that activity. See, e.g.,
Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2029 n.247 (2010).
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Skinner, the government cannot restrain a person from procreating188—
becoming pregnant or, presumably, carrying a pregnancy to term. But can it
coerce a person into doing so? In other words, is there a choice right with
regard to procreation? And if so, what kinds of not-X are covered by the right?
This issue is inevitably normative, and has formed the center of some of the
most divisive constitutional controversies of the past few decades. Most people
probably agree that some forms of compelled procreation are or should be
unconstitutional. Surely it is widely accepted that the government cannot force
people to have sex for purposes of procreation. But it is not clear that a right
not to have sex is the relevant not-X right, since coercion of sexual activity is
probably unconstitutional for reasons having nothing to do with procreation.
The petitioner in Skinner, after all, was prevented from procreating, not from
having sex. A better question is whether there is a right to engage in sexual
activity, or perhaps even to become pregnant, without procreating.
This was the issue at the heart of cases like Griswold v. Connecticut189 and
Roe v. Wade.190 The law in Griswold made it harder to have sex without getting
pregnant; the law in Roe made it harder not to carry a pregnancy to term. Both,
then, restricted the ability not to procreate, albeit in different ways. And in both
cases, the Court effectively recognized a right not to procreate,191 which, when
combined with the Skinner right, meant a choice right with regard to
procreation. Griswold did so by recognizing a right to “privacy” that shielded
all such decisions from state interference—effectively a “right to autonomy”
within certain spheres of life.192 In that sense, it was not exactly the equivalent
of a choice right, but rather an example of the interests underlying the right
(privacy, autonomy, and so on) becoming freestanding rights of their own.
But in Roe, Justice Blackmun took an approach much more akin to the
X/not-X analysis discussed here. He focused on the ways in which abortion
restrictions effectively force pregnant women to procreate, noting that
“[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future.”193 This coercion, he found, was at the heart of the

188. More accurately, Skinner establishes that such restraints raise constitutional questions. As
noted above, supra note 24, this Article focuses on questions of coverage, not levels of protection.
189. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Due Process Clause prohibits laws that unjustifiably impinge on the
“liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, which in turn includes “a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints”).
190. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
191. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1135, 1138 (2008) (concluding that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the
Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting it unquestionably protect a fundamental right not to be a
gestational parent” and exploring other forms of the right not to procreate).
192. See Henkin, supra note 26.
193. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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constitutional problem with restraints on abortion. He expounded on this idea
years later in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: “By
restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts women’s
bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the
pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care.”194
Many scholars and advocates have embraced a similar framing. Then-professor
Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that the abortion decision involves “a woman’s
autonomous charge of her full life’s course . . . .”195 Jed Rubenfeld has
similarly argued that “[a]nti-abortion laws, anti-miscegenation laws, and
compulsory education laws all involve the forcing of lives into well-defined
and highly confined institutional layers. . . . They affirmatively and very
substantially shape a person’s life; they direct a life’s development along a
particular avenue.”196
Griswold and Roe can therefore be explained on the grounds that the
Court effectively, though not explicitly, held that the right to procreate (X)
includes a right not to procreate (not-X). But as the continuing debate about
them demonstrates, the not-X right can take many forms. That is, there are
many ways to refuse to procreate. Griswold extended constitutional protection
to one—the use of contraception—which, despite continued criticism of its
reasoning, seems to have been more or less accepted by longstanding practice
and general consensus.197 Roe extended constitutional protection to another—
abortion, which is perhaps even more contentious today than it was when Roe
was decided. One can accept the existence of a right not to procreate and yet
deny that abortion is a protected form of exercising that right. Indeed,
opponents of abortion are not likely to recognize it as a valid not-X. And that,
too, is an irreducibly normative decision.
These examples demonstrate that the relationship between rights to and
not to is determined by the values underlying these rights. The move from a
right to speak to a right not to speak, for example, was apparently driven by the
Court’s changing view of the values and purposes underlying the right. That
view, likely influenced by the backdrop of World War II,198 explains why the

194.
195.
196.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928 (1992).
Ginsburg, supra note 182, at 383.
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989); see also
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 98
(1996) (“A woman who is forced by her community to bear a child she does not want is no longer in
charge of her own body. . . . The partial enslavement of a forced pregnancy is, moreover, only the
beginning of the price a woman denied an abortion pays.”); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of
Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971) (similar).
197. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734 (2011) (arguing
that constitutional rights can emerge from shared practices, expectations, and beliefs).
198. Primus argues that “[t]he reversal was largely driven by the Court’s desire to distinguish
America from wartime Germany.” PRIMUS, supra note 103, at 198; see also WALTER GELLHORN,
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Justices changed tracks in the three years between Gobitis and Barnette.
Similarly, the privacy, dignity, and autonomy interests at work in Griswold,
Roe, and their progeny animated the choice right of procreation. The Court has
thus invoked the language of choice—the right to choose between X
(procreation) and not-X (non-procreation)—but the protection of that choice is
a result of the Court’s view of the very purposes of the right itself. The Court
has, for example, described the abortion decision as “central to personal dignity
and autonomy,”199 and concluded that “[f]ew decisions are more personal and
intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and
autonomy, than a woman’s decision . . . whether to end her pregnancy.”200
This reliance on a kind of purposivist analysis—one that looks to the
values underlying particular rights—has led to a fusion of rights and the
interests or purposes animating them. When this happens, they become not
simply choice rights (rights to or not to do X) but truly rights to autonomy: to
do as one will, within certain boundaries. In Griswold, for example, Justice
Douglas found that the relevant right was not a right not to procreate, but
something seemingly broader: a right to privacy, which he found in the
“penumbras” and “emanations” of specific constitutional guarantees.201 In that
sense, the right became synonymous with the interests underlying it, and has
since made its mark in many other areas of constitutional law. In Lawrence, for
example, the Court determined that “[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make th[e] choice” to engage in private
sexual relationships.202 Indeed, Lawrence has been described as protecting not
equality but individual autonomy and a right to choose.203
What this suggests is that some choice rights essentially become rights to
autonomy, whatever the labels—such as “privacy”—under which they do
business. As Louis Henkin explained, the Justices’ invocation of a “right of
privacy” in cases like Roe and Griswold was “misleading, if not mistaken. . . .
What the Supreme Court has given us, rather, is something essentially different
AMERICAN RIGHTS: THE CONSTITUTION IN ACTION 96–107 (1960) (exploring the Gobitis/Barnette
turnaround).
199. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
200. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
201. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53
(outlining the line of cases recognizing the right to privacy).
202. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); see also id. (“The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within
the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”).
The Lawrence majority was in turn echoing Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick.
See 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[M]uch of the richness of a relationship will
come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.”).
203. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J.
1862, 1875 (2006) (“Lawrence refines the set of choices that an individual has a presumptive right to
make to those that qualify in some relevant way as status-defining.”).
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and farther-reaching, an additional zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity
to governmental regulation.”204 In such cases, rights shed the X/not-X
framework entirely and become stand-alone rights to autonomy. The realm of
freedom protected by these rights is different, perhaps significantly so, from the
choice rights described above. For while rights to and not to can be
characterized as “bilateral” and “two-way streets,”205 these autonomy rights
seem to have three dimensions. They are what courts and scholars mean when
they refer to “spheres,”206 “zones,”207 “areas,”208 “realms,”209 “boundaries,”210
or “sanctum[s]”211 of freedom.
The point of this Part is not to resolve these debates, nor to argue that this
characterization is the only or even the best way to understand them. The
abortion debate is about much more than the right to procreate or not. But the
preceding discussion has demonstrated at the very least that the relationships
between various rights to and not to depend on a normative analysis of the
values and purposes underlying the rights themselves.
B. Normative Frameworks
Demonstrating that the question of classification depends on constitutional
values is important, but does not by itself explain or enable critique of current
doctrine. Explanation and evaluation require something more: an account of
what kinds of constitutional purposes and values have shaped—or perhaps
204. Henkin, supra note 26, at 1410–11 (emphasis added).
205. See sources cited supra note 67.
206. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“[T]here are other spheres of our lives and existence,
outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence.”); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 548 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to
the abortion decision as within that “certain private sphere of individual liberty that the Constitution
reserves from the intrusive reach of government”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (referring to a
“sphere of individual liberty”); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives,
37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1722 (1992) (referring to a “sphere of individual sovereignty”).
207. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323, 325 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(referring to a “zone that no police can enter” in which “the choice of the individual to disclose or
reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses”); Henkin, supra note 26, at 1417 (referring
to “zones of autonomy”).
208. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (“[T]he Court has recognized that a right
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.”).
209. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (referring to a “private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter”).
210. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 447 (1983) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s “privacy” jurisprudence is in
fact concerned with “the sovereign authority to govern oneself, which is absolute within one’s own
moral ‘boundaries’”).
211. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that
the Fifth Amendment protects “a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought”) (citation
omitted).
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should shape—the taxonomy. This Section attempts to provide that account by
exploring two broad normative frameworks. The first focuses on whether the
right in question is “personal” or “public.” The second focuses on whether the
right, even if instrumentally designed to achieve some specific good, implies
the existence of a right not to.
The discussion is meant both to describe and to enable normative analysis.
That is, by identifying the arguments that best explain current practice, it seeks
to provide tools that can be used to evaluate whether particular rights are
properly classified, and how future controversies might be resolved.212
1. Personal and Public Rights; Intrinsic and Instrumental Freedoms
The first framework classifies rights based on whether they are “personal”
or “public”—whether a right’s justification and scope are focused on the
interests of the individual rightsholder or are instead grounded in some broader
social interest.213 If the latter, the right should generally be classified as an
option or protection right. If the former, one must then ask whether the personal
right guarantees individual autonomy for its own sake, in which case a choice
right will emerge, or else guarantees autonomy as a means to some other good,
in which case an option or protection right will usually be more appropriate.
Public rights, at least as the term is used here, are those justified on the
basis of purposes or values that are not coextensive with the interests of the
individual rightsholder. Such rights are generally instrumental, existing in order
to promote some particular conception of the good. Allowing an individual
rightsholder to refuse to do or accept the activity or process enumerated by the
right would therefore amount to a distortion of the right itself. Public rights are
like gears in a machine that are meant to turn only one way. The unwaivable
process rights discussed above are obvious examples.214 Of course, “public”
rights are still held by individuals, so some of them may balance the system’s
interests and the individual rightsholders’ autonomy—for example, by
permitting waiver. But that does not mean giving them full control over X.
Personal rights, by contrast, are those whose justification, form, and
function are centered on the individual rightsholder. They are almost always
classified as choice rights. Personal rights tend to, but do not always, value
212. Cf. JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF
AUTONOMY 6 (2006) (describing an approach of “constitutional constructivism” that is both
interpretive and normative).
213. Mazzone, supra note 18, at 865 (“There is a compelling reason to draw this distinction
between rights that implicate public values and rights that are more individually oriented.”).
214. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (“[W]hether certain procedures are
required . . . and whether the . . . choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the
right at stake.”); Berg, supra note 133, at 300–04 (describing “system limitations” on waiver); King,
supra note 25 (arguing that interests of nonparties and general public may justify restrictions on
waivers).
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individual autonomy for its own sake, since they focus on the interests of the
person who is engaging in or demanding the enumerated action or process. As
discussed in more detail below, the right to privacy (which encompasses
several other substantive rights) is a quintessential personal right. And like
other personal rights, privacy is generally treated as a choice right—one that
permits the rightsholder to choose whether to do or not do (or demand or
refuse) the various actions encompassed by the right to privacy. Similarly,
those who believe free speech is a fundamentally “individual” right—one
grounded in personal autonomy, expression, or identity, for example—tend to
treat it as a choice right.
Public rights are almost always option or protection rights, for the simple
reason that the values they further lie outside of the individual rightsholder and
therefore beyond individual choice. Similar arguments often have been used to
explain waivability, which, as noted above, is distinct from but related to the
issue of rights to and not to.215 Invoking the personal/public distinction,
Laurence Tribe concludes that “rights that are relational and systemic are
necessarily inalienable: individuals cannot waive them because individuals are
not their sole focus.”216 Similarly, Jason Mazzone suggests a “value-oriented
approach to all questions of waiver” under which “if waiver of a constitutional
right would undermine a compelling public value protected by the Constitution,
then individuals should not be able to waive the right.”217
The same approach that applies to waiver can also help explain the
classification of public-oriented rights in the trichotomy set out above. It can
explain, for example, why procedural rights have almost always been classified
as option or protection rights, rather than as choice rights.218 Simply put, they
are “public” rights serving purposes and values lying outside of individual
rightsholders: concerns of legitimacy, transparency, and efficiency in criminal
trials, for example.219 Allowing criminal defendants to refuse the processes
those rights enumerate would mean allowing them to subvert the public values
the rights were put into place to protect. An Eighth Amendment jurisprudence

215. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
216. Laurence H. Tribe, Commentary, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 333 (1985).
217. Mazzone, supra note 18, at 804. Others have made similar arguments. See sources cited
supra note 18; Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72
DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 862 (1995) (“[W]hen constitutional rights are perceived by courts as having a
large public goods dimension, courts will be reluctant to enforce contracts in which individuals waive
the exercise of the right in exchange for some discretionary benefit.”).
218. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.2, and II.C.2.
219. Cf. Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1004 (2010) (“[C]riminal procedure rights are
understood not simply as expressing constitutional values, or even as setting the ‘rules of engagement’
for criminal investigation and prosecution, but also as broader regulatory devices in the criminal justice
system.”).
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that permitted convicted criminals to insist on cruel and unusual punishments,
for example, would potentially be worse than no Eighth Amendment at all. Of
course, some procedural rights permit waiver, which is a concession to the
importance of autonomy. But there are very few procedural choice rights
permitting not just waiver but refusal of X. The exceptions—such as the right to
counsel—exist because they serve, as the Supreme Court put it, a “defendant’s
free choice independent of concern for the objective fairness of the
proceeding.”220 Indeed, the Court in Faretta specifically held that “[t]he right to
defend is personal . . . . It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free
personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his
advantage.”221 Faretta’s status as an outlier in criminal procedure jurisprudence
demonstrates the close connection between public rights and procedural rights,
and the consequent rarity of procedural choice rights.
As the Faretta example suggests, personal rights—those focused on the
interests of the individual rightsholder—are generally classified as choice
rights. For example, it has often been argued that the purpose of the free speech
right is to protect individual autonomy.222 If that is true, then it stands to reason
that freedom of speech should be a choice right. By contrast, if the purpose of
the right is to maximize the total amount of speech, then speech should
arguably be classified as an option right—one that would permit the
government to compel and thereby increase the total amount of speech.223
Nowhere is the relationship between personal rights and choice rights
clearer than in the constitutional right to privacy. Once understood and still
sometimes described as a right to shield one’s personal information from the
outside world,224 privacy now encompasses something more. Michael Sandel,

220. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 268 (1984).
221. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (emphasis added); id. (“[H]is choice must
be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 185 (1982)
(“The infusion of autonomy into constitutional thought was most easily accomplished in the area of
free speech.”); see also Fallon, supra note 68, at 902–03; Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in
Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 212 (2011) (“American free speech jurisprudence
also links autonomy and negative liberty with the dignity of the individual.”). But see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 235 (1993) (arguing against autonomy-based interpretations
of the First Amendment).
223. Cf. GELLHORN, supra note 198, at 96 (“Free speech, as we know, finds its chief
impersonal justification in the fact that unrestricted discussion is in the long run (and often in the short
run) likely to advance the welfare of a democratic society. Obviously, this same justification does not
support a right to keep one’s mouth closed. If there is any freedom not to speak, its existence must be
explained in somewhat different terms.”).
224. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2002)
(stating that privacy can be defined as “the ability to shield oneself from unwanted access by others”
and “control over personal information”).
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among many others,225 recognized that constitutional “privacy” is actually “the
right to make certain sorts of choices, free of interference by the state.”226 The
constitutional right to privacy thus clearly extends beyond what Justice
Kennedy calls its “spatial bounds,”227 and protects people’s ability to choose
whether to engage in particular forms of conduct, including abortion228 and
sexual intimacy.229 Each of these “privacy” rights is what this Article calls a
choice right, guaranteeing people’s freedom to choose between X and not-X.
The abortion debate, to take the most controversial example, is essentially
about whether the Constitution recognizes a right to choose “whether to bear or
beget a child.”230 Indeed, the very distinction between “pro-life” and “prochoice” neatly captures the difference between option rights and choice rights.
Classifying personal rights as protecting choice can also help explain
another interesting and increasingly important thread of American rights
discourse: the protection of choice where the ability to make certain choices is
necessary to maintain individual identity. The right-not-to-procreate argument
invokes this point by emphasizing the permanent status changes that pregnancy
and childbirth impose on women.231 But the argument can be extended into
other areas of constitutional law as well. Equal protection doctrine, for
example, prevents the government from discriminating on the basis of certain
characteristics, such as race, nationality, or sex. These appear to be aspects of
225. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 203, at 1890–95 (describing “fundamental decision”
privacy); Henkin, supra note 26, at 1425 (“Primarily and principally the new Right of Privacy is a
zone of prima facie autonomy, of presumptive immunity from regulation, in addition to that
established by the first amendment.”); Rao, supra note 222, at 207 (“In America, privacy interests are
often characterized as being a form of negative freedom—freedom from interference by the
government in one’s home or over personal decisions.”); Smith, supra note 222, at 189 (“Perhaps the
clearest expression of the new concern with autonomy came in the Court’s development of the
constitutional right to privacy in the mid-1960’s.”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Right to Privacy, in THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 25, 31 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2000) (“[P]rivacy might be regarded as the
face that autonomy presents to others similarly situated in the same community, merely one side of the
abstract dichotomy between public and private . . . .”).
226. Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality,
77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 526, 528 (1989).
227. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more
transcendent dimensions.”).
228. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); see also Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism,
Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 876 (1993) (“The language
of autonomy has provided the central rationale for protecting individual women’s control over the
abortion decision.”).
229. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
230. Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (“[T]he right recognized by Roe is a right ‘to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.’”) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
231. Id. at 851 (“Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under the compulsion of the State.”).
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one’s identity, not one’s conduct (except in the sense that “being” is conduct)
and therefore do not involve autonomous choice in the same way as the
decision whether to speak. But as Kenji Yoshino and others have demonstrated,
even these seemingly immutable characteristics are intertwined with and
sometimes dependent on conduct that is within one’s control.232 Justice Scalia
recognized as much in Romer v. Evans233 when he emphasized the difficulty of
drawing lines between sexual “orientation” and “conduct.”234 Restraining the
ability to engage in sexual intimacy therefore effectively restraints a person’s
ability to be who they are, just as restraints on abortion arguably coerce
pregnant women into being mothers.235 This connection between conduct and
identity seems to have facilitated the migration of equality claims from equal
protection to due process. As Yoshino notes, “the Court has moved away from
group-based equality claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to individual liberty claims under the due process guarantees of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”236
But while public rights are almost inevitably not choice rights, not all
private rights are choice rights. Many personal rights are (at least arguably)
designed with the interests of the individual in mind, and yet do not permit her
to choose between X and not-X. The prohibition on slavery is an interesting
example. It can be, and often has been, justified solely on the basis of
individual interests, and yet it prohibits individuals from making choices. John
Stuart Mill, for example, generally believed that liberty of action could only be
limited subject to the harm principle,237 but nevertheless concluded that people
could be prevented from selling themselves into slavery: “The principle of
freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to
be allowed to alienate his freedom.”238 Since a person who sells himself into
slavery “abdicates his liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single
act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the
justification for allowing him to dispose of himself.”239
As Mill’s argument demonstrates, separating those personal rights that
protect choice from those that simply guarantee an option or protection requires
an investigation of the very purposes of rights and freedoms. Roughly
speaking, there are two relevant visions in the philosophical literature: those

232. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
(2006); Greene, supra note 203.
233. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
234. Id. at 640–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. See sources cited supra note 196.
236. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (2011) (citations
omitted).
237. MILL, supra note 128; see Saunders, supra note 128.
238. MILL, supra note 128, at 125.
239. Id.
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that see rights as a means of protecting autonomy for its own sake, and those
that see rights as a means of promoting or protecting other goods.240 The former
are often referred to as will theories, the latter as welfare (or interest) theories.
The difference between them is essentially the difference between treating
autonomy as intrinsically and instrumentally valuable.
Will theories value autonomy above all else, and therefore tend to support
what this Article calls choice rights. So long as autonomy—the power to
choose241—is the ultimate good, then choice rights are obviously attractive,
since they maximize autonomy by permitting their bearers to select or decline
X.242 Such arguments are prominent in constitutional theory. Charles Fried, for
example, argues that “[i]t is the capacity to choose and judge for ourselves that
is the essence of our individuality and so of our liberty.”243 Richard Fallon says
that “autonomy holds unique promise to function as the constitutional value of
values.”244 And if autonomy is itself the primary value, then it makes sense that
rights to should include rights not to, so that the value itself can be maximized.
The intrinsic/instrumental division, like the public/private distinction
described above, has been used to explain waiver rules. Seth Kreimer writes:
“If the constitutional right in question is designed to secure an area of
autonomy for the citizen against the state, it would seem that the exercise or
nonexercise within that area should be in the hands of the citizen.”245 By
contrast, “many constitutional rights protect other values or protect individual
choice only as a means to the realization of other ends. For such rights, there is
no paradox in asserting that the choice of the individual should not decide the
applicability of the right in question.”246 Similarly, Kimberly Yuracko argues
that “[p]ermitting waiver of a constitutional right makes sense when the
justification for the right is primarily to bolster and reinforce the autonomy of
the right holder and where permitting waiver does not undermine any larger
social goals.”247
Even within the realm of will theories, however, relevant distinctions
emerge as to why autonomy and choice are worthy of protection. On one
account, autonomy and the power of choice is a good worth protecting in and

240. YOUNG, supra note 64, at 21 (“According to the one view, . . . autonomy derives its value
from other things which it makes possible. According to the second view, autonomy has value in and
of itself, independently of what it enables one to do or bring about.”).
241. See sources cited supra note 68 (describing choice theories of autonomy).
242. The one potential exception is the autonomous choice to give up one’s autonomy. And
that choice—the lone substantive protection right—can itself be explained by reference to autonomy,
as Mill does. See MILL, supra note 128.
243. FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY, supra note 100, at 94.
244. Fallon, supra note 68, at 876.
245. Kreimer, supra note 126, at 1383.
246. Id. at 1387.
247. Yuracko, supra note 131, at 153.
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of itself.248 On another account, choice is important because it is the most
efficient and accurate way to identify the good. Ronald Dworkin describes this
as an “evidentiary view” of autonomy.249 Mill seems to embrace it, arguing that
a person’s “voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or
at least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by
allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it.”250 It follows that the
individual rightsholder may be best positioned to determine whether a
particular not-X right is necessary to support the X-right. In Dale, for example,
the Supreme Court deferred to the Boy Scouts’ judgment that they needed to
exclude homosexuals in order to make their own expressive association
valuable.251
Inasmuch as it involves protecting choice as an instrument to find the
good, the evidentiary view of autonomy sounds a lot like a welfare theory of
rights. Whereas will theories tend to be associated with choice rights, welfare
theories are closely associated option and protection rights, which exist to
promote particular visions of the good rather than individuals’ ability to choose
among them. Joseph Raz, for example, argues that autonomy is “valuable only
if it is directed at the good” and “does not extend to the morally bad and
repugnant.”252 The appeal of this view, too, is relatively straightforward. For
inasmuch as rights are animated by values other than autonomy—fairness,
legitimacy, or transparency, for example—there is no particular reason to think
that individuals should be able to refuse the actions or processes they
enumerate. This is true even when those values are not “public.” For example,
individual dignity seems to be a squarely personal value. And yet, as Neomi
Rao has shown, dignity can also “express and serve as the grounds for
enforcing various substantive values,” which “embod[y] a particular view of
what constitutes the good life for man,”253 and “can be used to coerce
individuals by forcing upon them a particular understanding of dignity.”254 But
248. See Winick, supra note 206, at 1707 (“[A]llowing individuals to make voluntary choices
in matters vitally affecting them is developmentally beneficial and may be essential to their
psychological well-being.”).
249. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 222–23 (1993).
250. MILL, supra note 128, at 125.
251. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
252. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 411 (1986). Welfare theories are also
associated with the writings of Jeremy Bentham, Joel Feinberg, and Neil MacCormick, among others.
See FEINBERG, supra note 67, at 209; NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 143–60 (1982); H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal
Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 171, 171–79 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d series 1973).
253. Rao, supra note 222, at 187.
254. Id. at 227; see also Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092
(2001) (“Autonomy refers to the ability of persons to create their own identity and in this way to define
themselves. Dignity, by contrast, refers to ‘our sense of ourselves as commanding (attitudinal)
respect.’”) (citation omitted).
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just as will theories do not always promote choice rights, welfare theories do
not always promote option and protection rights. As Part III.B.2 explains in
more detail, a right can protect choice even if autonomy is not its animating
value.
In practice, the divisions described here tend to shade into one another. As
Justice Brandeis put it, “Those who won our independence believed that the
final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties . . . . They
valued liberty both as an end and as a means.”255 Nevertheless, the
personal/public distinction—and the related distinctions between will and
welfare theories of rights and intrinsic and instrumental valuation of freedom—
can largely explain whether particular Xs should be paired with not-Xs.
Even with these qualifications, this approach faces many complications.
First, what counts as personal and public is likely to be deeply contested. And
even if it can be said that the justification for a right is personal, that does not
mean that its effects will be strictly self-regarding. The abortion debate, to take
only the most obvious example, is deeply intertwined with the question of
whether a fetus has recognizable interests. If it does, then it is difficult to
describe abortion as a strictly “personal” incident of the right not to procreate.
And even holding aside the question of life itself, many argue that there are
public values at issue—the integrity of doctors, dignity of the community, the
value of potential human life, or the moral horror and emotional pain felt by
those who disapprove of abortion.256 Similar issues arise in other contested
areas.257 Garvey, who believes there is no right to suicide (no right to choose
between life and death, in other words), writes, “I do not think that our lives are
strictly our own, and I think that suicide affects the lives of others in several
ways, some of which warrant efforts to prevent it.”258
Second, categorizing rights as choice rights based on whether they are
“personal”—where that very concept is conflated with privacy and, in turn,
autonomy itself—threatens to be all-encompassing. If autonomy is a standalone good, then all government interference should presumably be prohibited,
and not simply that which limits the freedom to choose between various Xs and
not-Xs.259 This vision of autonomy as a freestanding right, rather than as
255. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
256. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157–58 (2007) (confirming Congress’s interest in
protecting the integrity of doctors, the lives of fetuses, and the value of human life in general).
257. Voting presents another situation in which the intrinsic/instrumental and public/private
distinctions could be relevant. See generally Note, The Case for Compulsory Voting in the United
States, 121 HARV. L. REV. 591, 592–93, 603 (2007) (making qualified case for compulsory voting).
258. Garvey, Control Freaks, supra note 49, at 16.
259. GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 5–6 (“If we are ruthless in carrying out this way of
thinking we are led to the conclusion that freedoms are universal, not bilateral, in character. If we think
of x as a road that X can travel along, then (according to the bilateralism thesis) such a road should be a
two-way street. But it seems just as bad to control X ’s course as her direction on any particular road.
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preventing restraint or coercion of particular Xs, is reflected in the Supreme
Court’s famous conclusion that “the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution.”260 Without a
limiting principle, this reading threatens to swallow the government’s ability to
regulate any conduct at all.261
But choice need not become the right that ate everything. Autonomy can
serve as an interest giving shape to other more specific guarantees without
necessarily being an enforceable right in and of itself.262 Implicitly identifying
this approach in the Court’s privacy cases, Louis Henkin explained that
“general autonomy for the individual was no longer proclaimed; he had, rather,
particular rights and liberties (notably those specified in the early provisions of
the Bill of Rights) which may be seen as establishing ‘special’ zones of
autonomy.”263 Making sense of this relationship between parts and the whole—
between liberties and liberty—is complicated, but not impossible. The effort
here has been to consider whether various specific rights should protect
particular areas of autonomous choice, not whether the Constitution creates a
freestanding right to be free of government restraint or coercion.
It is far beyond this Article’s scope or its author’s ability to resolve these
debates fully. The goal here is far more modest: to identify the normative
frameworks that may help determine whether a particular right to should be
accompanied by a right not to. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, one
such way is by considering whether a particular right is personal or public, an
inquiry that in turn leads to questions about whether the right protects
autonomy’s intrinsic or instrumental value.

The law cannot say that x1 is a more important road than x2, x3, . . . xn. The importance of any road is a
judgment for X to make.”).
260. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542–43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(“This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property . . . . It is
a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints . . . .”).
261. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 99–100 (1990).
262. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (“That many of the rights
and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected . . . .”).
263. Henkin, supra note 26, at 1417; see also id. at 1420–21 (“All of these pieces of explicitly
protected privacy do not add up to a complete right of privacy even by narrow definition.”); GARVEY,
FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 17 (“[T]here is no universal right to freedom. Instead there are certain
domains where we are free to act—certain constellations of protected activity.”); Smith, supra note
222, at 176 n.11 (noting that “no broad, general autonomy right has been recognized by the Court, only
discrete, particular rights with varying weights”).
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2. Beyond Autonomy: Instrumental Choice Rights
The discussion above suggests that only rights whose purpose is to protect
individual autonomy should be classified as choice rights. Tautological as it
may sound, this is not necessarily accurate. Sometimes a choice right—one that
protects both X and not-X—arises even when the right is instrumentally
designed to further constitutional values other than autonomy. For example,
some constitutional guarantees are instrumental and yet must encompass both a
right to and a right not to in order to achieve their basic aims. In other cases, X
and not-X independently serve the same underlying constitutional values and
are protected for that very reason. Finally, a choice right may arise even where
different values support X and not-X, so long as some interest appears on both
sides of the ledger. Under these three approaches a right may exist for a
particular purpose and yet still encompass a right not to.
The first version of this instrumental, purposivist analysis asks whether X
and not-X should both be protected for the simple reason that, given the
interests underlying the right, one cannot function without the other. As noted
above, the Court has implicitly adopted this approach with regard to the rights
of expressive association and speech. An association, it is thought, cannot
express itself if it cannot exclude people who would dilute or interfere with its
message.264 Similarly, it is plausible to think that the value of speech would be
degraded if people could be compelled to engage in it. Listeners would not
know whether a speaker was sincere, and coerced speakers themselves might
eventually lose the ability to determine and state their own “true” positions.265
The right to X must therefore include the right to not-X because the values
underlying the right could not be vindicated by the former alone. For other
rights, however, the inverse right is not so interdependent. The values
underlying the right to a public trial, for example—transparency and
legitimacy, among other things266—can be achieved without giving defendants
the right not to have a public trial. In such cases, the purposivist approach leads
to recognition of an option or protection right.
These arguments from necessity can be guided and occasionally even
answered by the text or structure of the Constitution itself. Choice rights are
sometimes, but not always, phrased to include both the doing and not-doing (or
acceptance and refusal) of X. In Faretta, for example, the Court concluded that
the right to decline counsel was “necessarily implied by the structure of the
[Sixth] Amendment,” in part because the Amendment refers to the “assistance”

264. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–20 (1984).
265. See Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 860–63 (arguing that compelled speech may undermine
credibility and sincerity).
266. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (“The central aim of a criminal proceeding
must be to try the accused fairly . . . .”).
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of counsel.267 The Court found that “the colonists and the Framers, as well as
their English ancestors, always conceived of the right to counsel as an
‘assistance’ for the accused, to be used at his option, in defending himself.”268
By contrast, the Eighth Amendment’s statement that “[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted”269 does not imply the existence of a choice.
Useful as it is, the textualist approach is not a silver bullet solution. The
language of the Free Exercise Clause, after all, arguably implies an option
right,270 and yet the Court has concluded that the Clause prohibits the
imposition, as well as restriction, of religious practice.271 Nor is it necessarily
clear that phrases such as “freedom of speech” should be read to encompass a
right not to speak as well as a right to do so. And of course the textualist
approach is of limited utility with regard to those rights—including association
and privacy—not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
The second, purposivist approach is somewhat different. It does not ask
whether X and not-X are inseparable, only whether they in fact serve the same
underlying values. Where this is the case, rightsholders should be able to
choose between them—they should have choice rights, in other words. On
these grounds, I have argued that the Second Amendment should be analyzed
as a substantive choice right protecting the decision whether to keep and bear
arms for self-defense.272 This argument is based on the fact that in District of
Columbia v. Heller273 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,274 the Supreme Court
identified “self-defense” as the “core” and “central component” of the Second
Amendment right.275 Because the decision not to keep or bear arms also
arguably furthers that core purpose, the choice should be protected. But that
argument—which carries important qualifications even on its own terms276—
would make no sense at all if the “central component” of the Second
Amendment were protecting state militias from disarmament by the federal
267. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
268. Id. at 832.
269. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
270. See GARVEY, FREEDOMS, supra note 1, at 43 (“Individual choice in matters of religion
should remain free: individual decisions are to be protected whether they operate for or against the
validity of any or all religious views . . . . The individual is freed from . . . the oppressive effects of
government regulation in order to believe or disbelieve as he chooses.”).
271. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“The free exercise of religion means, first
and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First
Amendment obviously excludes all ‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.’ The
government may not compel affirmation of religious belief . . . .”) (citations omitted).
272. See Blocher, supra note 24.
273. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
274. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
275. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
276. The argument depends, for instance, on a particular reading of the words “self-defense” in
Heller.
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government. Under the militia reading, the decision not to bear arms would
have little constitutional salience; it might even undermine the right itself. The
right’s purpose therefore determines whether it protects X, not-X, or the
freedom to choose between them.
A third possibility would recognize the existence of choice rights even
where different purposes support X and not-X, or where the same purpose
supports both but applies more strongly in one direction than the other.277
Assume, for example, that Lawrence stands for a right of adults to engage in
consensual sexual activity.278 That right is grounded in concerns of privacy,
liberty, and equality, and might well be fundamental.279 Presumably there is
also a right not to engage in sexual activity. But the latter right is undoubtedly
even more robust than the former, for surely coercion of sexual intimacy is
even more constitutionally problematic than restraint of it. And if that is
correct, then X and not-X are not exactly mirror images, for there are additional
interests underlying the protection of the latter. Sexual activity would therefore
be a choice right, albeit an asymmetric one.
The purposivist approach to classification has some apparent strengths,
both in terms of its descriptive accuracy and its normative appeal. But the
difficulties with such an approach should also be obvious. Some are common to
all forms of purposivism;280 others are more specific to the particular project at
hand. How are we to identify which purposes or values are the reason for a
right’s protection? Does predicating the scope of a right on the right’s
justification simply add another and perhaps even more contestable interpretive
question? And even assuming that these questions can be answered, the
purposivist approach can lead into choppy conceptual waters. If X and not-X
are justified by different values, then perhaps they are simply two different
rights, not flip sides of the same one. The right to associate, for example, might
be completely distinct from the right not to associate, and grounded in totally
different values: the former in expression, the latter in intimacy. Rights to X
and not-X could therefore be protected for different reasons, or to different
degrees. And yet they remain intertwined, for both are concerned with the same
conduct or process and the scope of one leads naturally into the other.

277. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. McFadden, HUAC, the Hollywood Ten, and the
First Amendment Right of Non-Association, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2001) (“In addition to the
affirmative right of association, the right of non-association should be seen as an outgrowth of a
completely different aspect of the First Amendment universe: the line of cases recognizing a First
Amendment right not to be forced to speak.”).
278. See Greene, supra note 203.
279. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1904 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence preserves a
fundamental right to intimate relationships).
280. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006).
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This demonstrates that one can believe that rights exist in order to serve
particular purposes other than autonomy and yet still conclude that they should
encompass both a right to a right not to. That conclusion, like the others
discussed in this Part, is irreducibly and inevitably a determination about the
purposes and values underlying the right itself.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to show that the relationship between rights to
and not to is an integral but underappreciated part of the theory and practice of
American constitutional law. The goals here have been to describe the choice,
option, and protection frameworks in terms of the government powers they
limit; to apply those frameworks to substantive and procedural constitutional
rights; and, finally, to consider some implications and complications arising
from this approach. Looking at rights through these three frameworks helps
illuminate not only the underlying purposes of rights, but also the kinds of
action they should protect or processes they should provide.
The approach suggested here offers a vocabulary and a framework
through which some of our most important political and legal debates can be
openly conducted. At the moment, the clearest of these is the debate over the
constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).281
Opponents of the ACA have characterized the law not only as an
unconstitutional expansion of federal authority, but as an unconstitutional
coercion of private action.282 In his opinion finding the mandate
unconstitutional, Judge Henry Hudson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia concluded, “At its core, this dispute is not simply about
regulating the business of insurance—or crafting a scheme of universal health
insurance coverage—it’s about an individual’s right to choose to
participate.”283
It remains unclear, however, which “X” is implicated by the ACA. One
possibility would be the right to decide whether or not to undergo medical

281. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
282. See, e.g., Ron Johnson, ObamaCare and Carey’s Heart, WALL ST. J., March 23, 2011, at
A15 (calling health care reform “the greatest single assault on our freedom in my lifetime” and
bemoaning the fact that “[f]or the first time in U.S. history, a personal inaction . . . will be deemed
unlawful”); Hank Silverberg, Virginia AG Argues for Health Care Repeal on Hill, WTOP.COM (Feb.
16, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.wtop.com/?sid=2274403 (quoting Virginia Attorney General Ken
Cuccinelli as saying, “[t]he litigation is not so much about health care as it is about liberty”).
283. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010); see also Florida v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (accepting the
individual mandate would mean accepting that “Congress could require that people buy and consume
broccoli at regular intervals”).
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treatment. Such a right does, after all, have some doctrinal support.284 But it is
also inapposite, not least because the ACA requires only the purchase of health
insurance, not any particular medical procedures. The right to contract would
be a more appropriate claim, but lacks doctrinal support.285
The first step toward having a more successful public debate over the
issue would be to begin discussing which right, precisely, is being invoked. The
second step would be to begin discussing which type of right it should be
viewed as—as one of personal autonomy, or as one which intrinsically or
instrumentally serves important public purposes.
This Article helps frame and explain the deeper issues underlying this and
other constitutional challenges. The ongoing debate over health care reform
drives home the fact that the relationship between rights to and not to is a
fundamentally normative one, tied up with the purposes and values of rights
themselves. Our discourse should reflect that fact.

284. See supra notes 115–116. But see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)
(upholding mandatory vaccination and rejecting the “inherent right of every freeman to care for his
own body and health in such way as to him seems best”).
285. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“[T]he violation alleged by
those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is
this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”).
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